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1 INTRODUCTION 
Industrialisation is considered as a necessary condition for a country‟s further development, 
contributing to economic growth and providing employment opportunities. The clothing 
industry has generally been regarded as an important first step of industrialisation in 
developing countries (Applebaum et al. 2005). The low capital investments required in 
production make it possible for the industry to be transferred to poorer countries. The nature 
of the industry with its low entry barriers, high labour-intensity and mobility has made it 
function as an economic springboard, by absorbing surplus labour and attracting foreign 
direct investments (Jauch & Traub-Mertz 2006). The global dispersion of clothing-related 
activities can thus be related to the fact that the production process is highly fragmented and 
can easily be exported at all stages. These factors have also made the industry relatively 
„footloose‟ and able to adjust quickly to changing market conditions (Nordås 2004). 
 Trade in clothing was long protected through the quota system of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement (MFA) in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), first established to protect 
developed countries from cheap imports. An additional effect of the quota system was that 
production capacities spread to numerous countries. Several links were added in the value 
chain of clothing for companies to make use of quotas in different countries. The quota 
regime thus protected clothing production from the high levels of competition on the global 
market. This has now changed. After phasing out the MFA over a ten year period, the 
industry opened up to free trade in 2005.  
The spread of capacities in clothing production has certain consequences, namely 
increased competition. According to Kaplinsky (2001), the competitive pressure will heighten 
when capabilities increase in an industrial activity. This dynamic is especially apparent in the 
clothing industry, where the spread of production capabilities has increased the pressure on 
production costs. When labour cost is one of the variables determining the final cost of 
production, competitive pressure will hit labour and the local regulative framework. When 
entry barriers fall in an industrial activity, companies will strive to create new terrains of 
economic operations to enhance profit and distance themselves from the competitive pressure. 
The companies caught in activities with low entry barriers will ultimately lose in the process 
of capital accumulation (Kaplinsky 2001), leading them to apply strategies to avoid labour 
regulations that hamper competitiveness. The message from the global arena is clear; learn 
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how to compete or exit. This has made manufacturers search for alternative strategies to cope 
with the new rules of the game (MacCormick & Rogerson 2004). 
Academic attention has been centred on the Asian experience of trade liberalisation of 
the labour-intensive industry - the formation of export-processing zones and deteriorating 
labour conditions. Another research front has focused on high fashion clusters, product 
development and innovation in e.g. northern Italy. The African experience has been in the 
shadow, making it more difficult to grasp the current trends on the continent (Jaunch & 
Traub-Merz 2006). South Africa is especially interesting in this regard, as it is an African 
middle-income country. Hence, South African clothing production falls between the dual 
division seen dominating competitiveness in the global clothing industry:  
It is neither a high-value-added, fashion-oriented, first-world player competing through 
the best technologies, highly skilled personnel and specialized market knowledge; nor is 
it a low-cost, mass-based, developing-country industry competing via scale economies, 
low-cost labor and aggressive government policies (Morris & Reed 2009:202). 
The question remains; what is South Africa‟s position in the value chain of clothing? 
South African clothing production has provided the country with industrial development and 
employment in low- and semi-skilled positions. As opposed to other African countries, South 
Africa was to a certain extent shielded from extensive world trade in clothing until 
democratisation in 1994. This meant a longer period where clothing manufacturers held the 
bargaining power in the value chain and could demand a price from retail that could be passed 
on to the consumers. The rapid liberalisation of the economy in South Africa through 
membership in the WTO in 1995 and the policies of Growth, Employment and Restructuring 
(GEAR) from 1996 have altered the conditions for trade and competition (Gibbon 2002).  
Production in Asian countries, and especially China, poses a threat to the industry due 
to lower production costs and a more efficient production (Jaunch & Traub-Merz 2006). The 
South African market is flooded with cheap imports, which are weighing heavily on the 
national industry. The previous direction towards the domestic market is now one of the 
greatest challenges facing the industry, which has not managed to build up a sustainable 
structure that can compete globally.  
With the outlined conditions as a backdrop, the thesis‟ point of departure is the 
clothing industry in Durban, the largest city in the eastern region of KwaZulu-Natal. The 
industry is currently struggling to cope with the changed competitive environment. The 
Durban context is interesting because of the fragmented industrial structure, the low levels of 
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skills and the traditional focus towards mass-production (Gibbon 2002, Barnes 2005). These 
conditions are in sharp contrast to e.g. Cape Town which has displayed more advanced 
behaviour in process innovation, technology advancements and skill improvements (Altman 
1996). Hence, Durban faces direct competition with other low-cost areas in the Southern 
African region and Asia, while pursuing relatively strict labour regulations. The literature 
reveals that Durban has experienced great losses of employment and has had one of the 
highest numbers of company closures in the South African industry (Gibbon 2002, Skinner & 
Valodia 2002, Barnes 2005). Clothing is one of the six most important industries in Durban in 
terms of total employment and output, making the deteriorating competitiveness amongst 
manufacturers a burning issue (Morris et al. 2001). 
1.1 Research Questions 
The purpose of the thesis is to contribute to the literature that reveals an incompatibility 
between competitiveness and protection of labour in labour-intensive industries. The literature 
points to tendencies regarding global competition at the manufacturing level, where the 
spread of capabilities in clothing production has made production costs subject to competition 
(Munck 2002, Bergene 2010). In combination with neo-liberal policies aiming to break down 
barriers to free trade, places compete against each other to attract investments in production 
(Lier 2007). This has made it difficult to sustain strict labour regulations, as the cost of labour 
will determine the cost of production. This can reinforce the accumulation of power in the 
retail end of the value chain where companies are able to distance themselves from the 
competitive pressure at the manufacturing level (Nordås 2004). In the Durban context, 
through the perspective of manufacturers and related institutions, the tendencies will be 
explored through the following research question: 
- What are the factors that deteriorate competitiveness of the manufacturers in the 
industry, and how do these affect their position in the value chain? 
 
Deteriorating competitiveness will spur local response. The literature reveals that profit is 
problematic to achieve in the highly competitive area of production, making manufacturers 
search for new combinations and alternatives to stay in business (Kaplinsky 2001). The 
competition at the manufacturing level will ultimately hit workers, leading to a further 
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segmentation of the workforce and an increased competition for the low- and semi-skilled 
positions with unstable working conditions (Beerepoot 2010). The following research 
questions will explore how manufacturers choose to deal with the altered competitive 
framework, and how this is affecting the Durban labour force: 
 
- What strategies are manufacturers in Durban using to stay competitive? 
 
- How do these strategies affect employment opportunities in the Durban labour 
market? 
 
Some of the concepts applied need further elaboration. I will use the concept of strict labour 
regulations. This is not a fixed term, but refers to labour regulations that are strict relative to 
how they influence competitiveness at the manufacturing level. The labour regulations I refer 
to are the formal regulations established in national law, maintained and developed in the 
national Bargaining Council for the clothing industry. If the labour regulations demand wages 
and other labour protective measures that heighten production costs to a level that make 
manufacturers unable to compete with production costs elsewhere, these regulations are 
regarded strict. I will only comment on labour regulations regarding how they affect 
production costs and employment, and not explore working conditions. 
I will use the concepts of regulated and unregulated business. Regulated business are 
those establishments that fall under the jurisdictions of the Bargaining Council (further 
explained in the background chapter), unregulated business will refer to those that do not. 
These concepts are also transferred to workers; workers in companies that do not fall under 
the local labour regulations, and workers in companies that do. I will also describe companies 
as compliant or non-compliant, which basically have the same meanings as regulated and 
unregulated business. Compliant companies follow the labour regulations, and non-compliant 
companies do not. It may be argued that the distinction I use between regulated and 
unregulated business can relate to the concepts of formal and informal business. In the 
Durban industry, with the reference being solely to regulation from the Bargaining Council, 
my dichotomy is more accurate. The thesis wants to illustrate the perspective of 
manufacturers, justifying the choice of concepts to describe the distinction of 
regulated/unregulated business and strict labour regulations. 
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Given the introduction and the research questions presented above, the structure of the 
remaining thesis is as follows: Chapter two provides the theoretical framework, while chapter 
three gives a background to and situates the case of Durban in the global clothing industry and 
the South African context. Chapter four presents and discusses the research methods applied 
in the thesis. Chapter five and six contain the analysis; firstly analysing constraints to 
competitiveness in Durban, and secondly the responses to competition. Finally, chapter seven 
collects the concluding elements of the thesis.  
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2 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The theoretical framework will firstly outline the dynamics of capitalist production before 
linking these to the expansion of a global production system through neo-liberal policies and 
processes of globalisation. Further, theories of industrial value chains will be applied to 
explain dynamics and governance at the industrial level, while labour segmentation and a 
global division of labour present theoretical explanations of labour market dynamics. 
2.1 The Dynamics of Capitalist Production 
Current patterns in global trade are intrinsically connected to the underlying premises of 
capitalist production. This section will present a theoretical approach to the dynamics of 
capitalism.   
The capitalist system is dependent on two forms of commodities: labour power and the 
means of production. The means of production signifies everything necessary for labour to 
produce, e.g. machinery or materials. For capital to accumulate, what is produced and sold for 
money must generate a surplus value above the inputs in the production process (Lier 2007). 
Hence, access to ever cheaper inputs and widening markets to find new profitable 
opportunities is important to uphold the accumulation process. Through the capitalist logic of 
power, territories must constantly be opened up to capitalist development. This openness does 
not simply refer to trade, but additionally allow the capital to make use of cheap labour 
power, raw materials, low-cost land etc. (Harvey 2003). From this logic one can establish that 
capitalism is an inherently expansionary production system. According to Harvey (1982 in 
Lier 2007:815), “geographical expansion provides a strong basis for sustained 
accumulation”. The need for expansion is initiated in search for new markets and new ways 
to make profit, as well as to overcome its own internal crises. Thus, an increased number of 
places and workers are linked under the same capitalist system of interdependence. These 
socio-economic processes at a global scale often impose fundamental limitations on local 
issues. Lier (2007) further goes on to explain how the global expansion of capitalism is 
inherently uneven in the way it affects places and workers differently, and constructs 
contradictory and competitive relationships between them. The spread of capitalism as a 
hegemonic production system, through processes of economic globalisation, has constructed 
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dependency and vulnerability of places to capitalist processes across space. Capitalism 
continues to create class processes leading to social inequality and conflict. 
 The capitalist system conceals a range of contradictions, one of them being how crisis 
both challenge and drive the system. Botwinick (in Moody 1997:45) explains the following: 
“the relentless drive to expand capital value is necessary accompanied by a growing struggle 
over market share. These two dynamics, accumulation and rivalry, are inextricably bound up 
with one another”. Moody (1997) goes on to explain how the competition referred to above 
signifies how capitalism is regulated by constant crises. The competition that fuels these 
crises does so by driving firms to increase investments to improve efficiency and reduce 
costs.  He differentiates between deep and long-lasting crises like the Great Depression of the 
30s and the persistent crisis of profitability since World War Two, and other smaller and 
cyclic like that of business-cycle recessions in 1981-83 and 1990-93. One can further mention 
the financial crisis of 2008-09. The credit system had smoothed out minor problems in the 
capitalist system, but additionally worked to accumulate these problems. The core of the crisis 
was a lack of reinvestment opportunities of the surplus value created in production (Harvey 
2010). Crises are in Harvey‟s (2010:117) words; “necessary to the evolution of capitalism as 
money, labour power and capital itself”. 
2.1.1 Individual Capitalists under Capitalism 
 
The capitalist system consists of different individual capitalists. These do not necessarily 
cooperate down the same path towards further capital accumulation, it is in fact the opposite. 
Individual capitalists are acting from their self-interest under the social relations of capitalist 
production and exchange. They are forced, through competition, to make technological 
restructurings that might threaten further accumulation, balanced profits and capitalists as a 
class (Harvey 1982). According to Marx (in Harvey 1982:202), the relationship between 
individual capitalists depends on their independent ability to accumulate: 
So long as things go well, competition effects an operating fraternity of the capitalist 
class…so that each shares in the common loot in proportion to the size of his respective 
investment. But as soon as it no longer is a question of sharing profits, but of sharing 
losses, everyone tries to reduce his own share to a minimum and to shove it off upon 
another. The class as such must inevitably lose. How much the individual capitalist must 
bear of the loss…is decided by strength and cunning, and competition then becomes a 
fight among hostile brothers. The antagonism between each individual capitalist‟s 
interests and those of the capitalist class as a whole, then comes to surface… 
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As a vast number of competing firms make up the total of capital, conflict is an inherent part 
of the capitalist system. Lier (2007:818) explains the conflict by stating that individual 
capitalists have a “knife-edged movement along a crisis-prone trajectory”. He further goes on 
to argue that this fundamental tension between individual capitalists and capital-in-general 
will lead to different strategies of restructuring in place, e.g. the process of outsourcing, and 
restructuring across space, e.g. through relocation. Harvey (2010) points out that competition 
is necessary to keep the permanent expansion of production going, and thus for capitalism‟s 
survival.  
2.1.2 Labour under Capitalism 
 
To understand how the dynamics of capitalism affects labour and labour markets, 
understanding the role of labour in the production process is significant. According to 
Braverman (1974), labour under capitalist production has distinct characteristics: the worker 
is separated from the means of production and has access to it only when selling labour power 
to others. The worker is freed from legal constraints - such as slavery – that deny them in 
having the determining power over their own labour. The purpose of hiring the worker is to 
enhance the part of capital that belongs to the employer, and the worker enters this deal 
because the social conditions do not offer any alternatives. After being forced to sell his/her 
labour power, the worker has to give up any interest in the labour process since he/she is 
alienated from it. The labour process is, as such, the responsibility of the capitalist. In this 
process the complete realisation of the bought labour power might be weakened as a result of 
the contradictory interests of those who determine the purpose of the labour process and the 
ones who execute it (Braverman 1974). According to Marx (in Harvey 2010), reproduction 
and expansion of capital depend on a labour pool which has to be “accessible, socialized, 
disciplined and of the requisite qualities (i.e. flexible, docile, manipulable and skilled when 
necessary)” (Harvey 2010:58). Without these conditions, continuous capital accumulation 
may be challenged. 
2.1.3 Supply and Demand of Labour 
 
The conflict between capital and labour, understood as the balance between wages and profit, 
is explained by Harvey (1982) through his discussion of Marx‟ Capital. Marx describes the 
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value of a total social product as the sum of constant capital, value of labour power and total 
surplus value produced. The labourers trade the use value of the commodity they possess, 
which is labour power, in return for a money wage. The market, according to neoliberal 
arguments, fixes the value of labour power through supply and demand. What Marx argues 
(in Harvey 1982) is that capital has a certain power to influence both. Through the logic, 
capital may affect both supply and demand through restructuring, and thus contribute to the 
determination of labour‟s value. On the supply side this could occur through the process of 
„primitive accumulation‟1, mobilisation of latent sectors in the labour force, migration, or by 
producing relative surplus populations. These processes can be made possible through 
policies of the capitalist state, e.g. population and immigration policies. With a surplus of 
workers, the value of each worker will be less, and capital can both take advantage of the 
demand for jobs by workers as well as being able to replace workers if not satisfying capital‟s 
needs. Demand-wise, capital can adjust its requirements through reorganisation, restructuring 
and technological change (Harvey 1982). That way, capital may change the production 
process and thereby make labour obsolete. This would mean that the value of labour power is 
in fact affected by capital, and not by the balance of the market. Marx‟ theoretisation may 
come across as somewhat conspiratorial in the way he uses capital and labour as fixed 
concepts and dedicate enormous power on capital‟s behalf, but in relation to how companies 
may react to e.g. wage increases, the understanding is still a useful approach.  
According to Harvey (1982), capital will only let wages rise if they do not interfere 
with the accumulation of capital. The reason for bringing labour into the production process 
is, as mentioned, to enhance the part of value in the capitalist‟s hands (Braverman 1974). This 
means that the balance between wages and profit must leave a surplus value on capital‟s 
behalf to continue its local operations. If labour has succeeded in a struggle, e.g. through trade 
unions, wages will raise and profit decrease. When this occurs, accumulation of capital will 
slow down and ultimately lead to stagnation. Capital will then recess from areas where profit 
is not created. The recession will have the effect of disciplining labour; reducing wages to re-
establish the balance. A rise in unemployment will e.g. have this effect on the labour force. 
Companies, as individual capitalists, may become more cautious in adjusting their workforce 
                                                 
1 The concept of primitive accumulation is, according to Marx, the original process where capital found 
new assets outside itself to confront and circumvent pressures of overaccumulation. The concept is 
further developed by Harvey (2003) to explain how these processes did not end with the original creation 
of an ‘industrial reserve army’, but continue to take place under current capitalism e.g. through the 
commodification and privatization of land. He then refers to the concept as ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. 
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with the effect of reducing labour turnover. Some companies are more committed to less 
mobile investments. Production capital may support an alliance with labour by compromising 
on wage rates, as they are depending on local labour markets and restructuring or relocation 
are unfavourable options. Still, production capital may often not afford to ignore the 
availability of more profitable locations. High labour protection can thus raise labour costs 
and thereby reduce job creation. Protection levels must be traded off for either lower wages or 
higher productivity, or it can lead to lower job creation and possibly lower investment in new 
technologies (Harvey 1982). 
2.2 Responding to the Crisis of Fordism  
The regulation school is a useful approach in understanding how production patterns and 
labour markets have changed as a response to an accumulation crisis in the capitalist system. 
This section will elaborate on what made these changes possible and the global effects on 
production and politics.  
In 1973, the capitalist system in the developed world entered a state of crisis: 
Stagflation, rising unemployment and spiralling oil prices led to a phase of deep restructuring. 
The crisis showed that the form of capitalist production dominating the post-war period was 
unsustainable (Tickell & Peck 1992). The internal and external crisis provoked significant 
changes. The outcomes of the crisis cannot be seen as homogeneous globally, but it created 
interrelated and coexisting labour regimes with different forms of labour organisation and 
control (Lipietz 1997). 
Harvey (2006) states that the social pact between capital and labour in the majority of 
Western countries in the 50s and 60s, resulted in high growth. The policies in most advanced 
capitalist societies included redistributive politics, control over free mobility of capital, public 
expenditure and welfare state building, which coincided with high rates of capital 
accumulation and profitability. This was known as Fordism, which Lipietz (1997) analyses in 
three ways: First, as a principle of organizing labour where administration and the production 
process were held strictly separated (also known as Taylorism). The management controlled 
organisation, while production was divided into concrete tasks for the workers. Secondly, 
Fordism comprised a macroeconomic structure where gains from the organisational principles 
would derive from an increase in financial investments from profits, and from the increased 
purchasing power of wage labourers. The third was a mode of regulation, where Fordism had 
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rigid controls over employment, and wages increased proportionally to prices and 
productivity. Supplements from the welfare state gave a permanent income for waged labour 
(Lipietz 1997). This combination of a regime of accumulation and a mode of social regulation 
has been referred to as the social compromise between capital and labour (Munck 2002). The 
growth in productivity led to a significant rise in real wages, which then resulted in the 
formation of mass markets for consumer goods (Tickell & Peck 1992). According to Lipietz 
(1997), the demand-side was based on salaries inside each country. The external constraints 
were limited because of a correspondence of growth between different countries and the 
limited importance of international trade relative to the growth in domestic markets. 
Monopoly conditions in the productive sphere allowed firms to maintain prices irrespective of 
demand (Tickell & Peck 1992). As pointed out above, competition is necessary for 
capitalism‟s survival. Hence monopolisation and centralisation of capital can provoke internal 
crises (Harvey 2010), which ultimately happened under Fordism. 
The system began to break down by the end of the 1960s, both internationally and 
within domestic economies. On the demand-side, competitiveness started levelling out 
between the leading economies in USA, Europe and Japan, and the search for economies of 
scale led to an internationalisation of production processes and markets between developed 
countries. When prices on imports of primary commodities increased in the start of the 70s, 
competition intensified. Subcontracting of production to either non-Fordist countries, „the 
socialist bloc‟ or Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) was used as a way to overcome 
national rigid labour regulations. Because of the need to balance external trade, the rigidity of 
national wage policy had to be compromised (Lipietz 1997).  
When profitability decreased in the 1970s, this was due to a fall in productivity, 
growth of total labour costs, a worsening of the capital-product ratio, and increasing 
commodity prices. The problems were identified as supply side related, and focus turned to 
the capital-labour relationship. According to Lipietz (1997), profit was low because of 
limitations from a strong labour force, a result of the inflexible rules of the game. The system 
that had regulated international economic relations had dissolved and politics of liberal 
flexibility were established in many of the leading economies, followed by most countries in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The social 
compromise had collapsed as a way to combine capital accumulation and social democratic 
politics. With the internationalisation of production and growth in the export sector, wages 
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were no longer seen as a contributor to consumption, but a heave on economic 
competitiveness (Tickell & Peck 1992). The move away from the social compromise:  
...attained different degrees and was drawn on different fronts: from the rules governing 
wage rises to the breadth and depth of social security, from the liberalisation of 
employment laws to the proliferation of insecure jobs (Lipietz 1997:4). 
Socialist and communist states sought a deepening of state control and a restrictive regulation 
of the economy. The right-wing answer, and also the answer to threats against the capitalist 
social order, was neo-liberalism. With British and American policies in front, the welfare state 
was abandoned for monetarist supply-side solutions. It reformed fiscal and social policies in a 
search for higher flexibility within the economy. The policies included a rolling back of the 
welfare state and privatising of public enterprises to provide a favourable business climate for 
foreign investments. These political changes meant a relocation of power over capital 
accumulation to owners and their financial institutions (Harvey 2006).  
Externally, neo-liberal states seek to reduce the barriers to movement of capital across 
borders and to open markets to global forces of capital accumulation. The powers of 
international competition and the ideology of globalisation were used to discipline internal 
opposition while new areas for capitalist activity were opening abroad. With the creation of 
new international institutional arrangements like the WTO, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, large corporate capitalist interests could cooperate with 
government power in policy making (Harvey 2006). It is important to point out that neo-
liberal policies were not established throughout the world instantly; many European and 
Asian states resisted neo-liberal reforms and held on to the old social democratic policies. 
Harvey (2006) explains how it was still possible for the neo-liberal project to be implemented 
on the world stage: Firstly with the financialisation that begun in the 1970s and escalated 
through the 1990s, where foreign direct investments and portfolio investments rose 
throughout the capitalist world; and secondly, structural adjustment programs from the IMF in 
the developing world combined with American preferential trade agreements spread neo-
liberal policies. This began to put competitive pressure on the more rigid systems in Europe 
and Japan. It has been argued (Munck 2002, Bergene 2010) that the mobility of capital 
created a competition between social systems. National policies were now formed to attract 
business through deregulation, to provide an environment in which capital could operate. The 
use of national bargaining to take wages out of competition faded as a result of the increased 
mobility of capital. The economic integration of global capitalism thus forced companies to 
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compete on labour costs. Parts of production shifted to low-cost areas, with enterprises 
keeping marketing and management in developed countries. The strategies of outsourcing and 
subcontracting spread to maximise flexibility, with major corporations holding the power 
(Taylor & Bryson 2010).  
The policies of neo-liberal flexibility and global competition have marked the domain 
of production. Munck (2002) highlights that what seems to be emerging in many parts of the 
world is similar to old production modes, but without the social institutions and the social 
compromise that gave stability in the post-war period. Neo-liberalism is seen to have 
undermined the social compromise between labour and capital.  
2.2.1 Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation 
 
The expansion of functional integration of trade operations between states has become known 
as globalisation. This concept is one of the most used, misused and confused of current terms 
(Dicken 2003). As outlined by Alvstam and Schamp (2005:xxiii), globalisation seems “to 
work at all times and in all places, to penetrate all spheres of economic life and to determine 
both the worlds of practice and scientific discourses”. This comprehension, among many, is 
neutralizing the processes of globalisation when presenting it as unavoidable. Different 
agents, e.g. states or international organisations, are portrayed as powerless in affecting or 
adjusting the outcome. The concept of globalisation has become so exhausted that it has lost 
any comprehensible meaning, and the politics and practise that govern the outcome are 
hidden. As we have seen, it is more useful to connect the processes of globalisation to 
capital‟s search for new markets and the spread of neo-liberal policies. Where others explain 
globalisation as a force of history, Van der Westhuizen (2009) argues that it is the result of 
political and policy decisions made by powerful elites to advance and defend their interests. 
She sees the ideology of neo-liberalism as central, as it pursues a world where the market 
reigns over society. Globalisation, in her view, is exploiting the relative weakness of 
countries, where international regulations are forced upon nations that remove state protection 
for industries and populations, and replace it with vulnerability.  
The definition of globalisation as a “closer integration of the countries of the world as 
a result of the lowering of transportation and communication costs, and the removal of 
artificial, man-made barriers” (Stiglitz 2003 in Van der Westhuizen 2009:618) is misleading 
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as it directs focus towards the technical aspects of globalisation and hides the ideological. Her 
proposed definition would be the following:  
Neo-liberal globalisation is the increasing interconnectedness between states, through 
the accelerated movement of goods, services, capital and, to a significantly lesser extent, 
labour across national borders – a process enabled by political decisions to deregulate 
capital and liberalise trade, and by related advances in technological capabilities. 
Therefore, these „intensified processes of spatial interconnection‟ are associated with 
capitalist restructuring and are „deeply infused‟ with the exercise of power (Hart 2000 in 
Van der Westhuizen 2009:618).  
Neo-liberal globalisation has also been made possible through the power it is trying to 
subjugate; the state. In contrast to governments claiming their powerlessness against the 
„forces of globalisation‟, the state‟s reduced role is actually pursued through its own political 
design (Van der Westhuizen 2009).  
Local economic strategies can be seen in the light of global neo-liberal trends of 
deregulation and flexibilisation. Because of the mobility of capitalist interest, they can take 
advantage of labour by enhancing regime competition and pit places and workers against each 
other. When this results in a restraint on wage levels and labour legislation, capital has 
succeeded in regaining control over labour. It is argued that the mobility of capital is in fact 
exaggerated, but built up through the political success of capitalism. By depoliticising global 
competition and labour market dynamics through neo-liberal policies, and portraying this as 
an inevitable and natural process, capitalism has succeeded (Lier 2007). The spread of neo-
liberal policies can be seen as a way to oppress the power of labour and simultaneously free 
the laws of competition to secure continued capitalist accumulation (Harvey 2010).  
 The concept of globalisation has also been seen as a process of subordinating place to 
space in the way that capital has overcome the pressure and challenge of local labour needs. 
Jonas (1996) argue that this is not the case, but that globalisation must be seen as localizing 
struggles around capital‟s needs for labour control. This will in turn lead to an unevenness of 
labour market conditions. Thus, the mobility of capital threatens local institutions of labour 
market regulation, and has lead to various approaches locally. According to Moody (1997), 
the power relations of the capitalist world are crucial when discussing the concept of 
globalisation:  
While there are powerful international market forces, world-wide corporate operators, 
and production systems that stretch across borders, there is no seamless global market, 
no corporation operating with the same weight everywhere, no production system that 
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spans the entire world. What is global is capitalism as an economic system (Moody 
1997:66).  
He denies the existence of free trade and perfect competition, but that the phenomena are 
portrayed as such through neo-liberal policies and the rhetoric of globalisation. Hence, power 
relations should be seen as a key factor when examining global trade. 
2.3 The Power Relations within Value Chains 
So how can one connect the more overarching dynamics of global, capitalist trade and 
competition to specific industries? Who dominates an industry when the different stages 
behind consumer goods are dispersed throughout the world? The following theoretical 
approach will aim at linking the theories of capitalist dynamics and expansion with the 
industrial level through the concept of value chains.  
In discussing trade and production, certain classifications have been developed as to 
explain the links between design, production, marketing, distribution and sale in global trade. 
The value chain analysis firstly became widely used in the 1990s, especially through the 
workings of Michael Porter (1985, 1990) and Womack and Jones (1996). The concept of 
value chains was further developed by Gereffi (1994, 1999), relating it to developing 
countries and building on an analysis of world systems (Kaplinsky 2001).  
The terminology differs between researchers in explaining very similar ideas; global 
commodity chains, value chains, value systems, production networks and value networks. At 
the Bellagio-conference in 2001 on value chains, 14 researchers came together, discussing the 
work on value chains in explaining global trading networks (Gereffi et al. 2001).  They found 
that out of the different terms, the value chain perspective was the most effective in 
explaining the various forms a functional integration between internationally dispersed 
activities may take. More importantly, it problematises the question of governance – on how 
value chains are organised and managed. The concept allows for thinking about firms that 
only perform certain value chain operations, such as design or marketing, and therefore makes 
it possible to analyse questions on how power, governance and the dynamics of chains occur. 
The value chain analysis:  
...highlight the relative value of those activities that are required to bring a product or 
service from conception through the different phases of production (involving a 
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combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer services), 
delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use (Gereffi et al. 2001:3).  
Governance can be defined as “non-market coordination of economic activity” (Gereffi et al. 
2001:4), and involves the ability of one firm in the chain to influence, control or decide 
activities of other firms in the chain. Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) argue that the value chain 
perspective brings important issues to the debate on globalisation by highlighting how 
producers participate in global trade. By addressing the nature and determinants of 
competitiveness, it can clarify the position of individual and groups of firms. Simultaneously, 
it helps identify the activities that will deliver increasing profits and those that will not.  
Gereffi‟s (1999) concept of global commodity chains was developed earlier, but is 
based on the same understanding. It leaves a good basis for identifying power distribution and 
pressure in global trade. He distinguishes between producer-driven and buyer-driven 
commodity chains. They will further be referred to as value chains. Producer-driven value 
chains are found mainly in industries where large manufacturers, often transnational, play the 
central role in coordinating the value chain. Examples could be capital- and technology 
intensive industries like automobiles, computers or heavy machinery. Because of the capital-
intensity, the barriers to entry are higher for new firms, and the lead firms in these chains 
usually belong to global oligopolies. There are often multiple companies involved in 
production, parents, subsidiaries and subcontractors, leaving the producer-driven chain 
relatively fragmented (Gereffi 1999).  
The buyer-driven value chain, on the other hand, refers to industries where retailers, 
marketing companies and branded manufacturers are the lead companies, structuring 
decentralised production networks in several exporting countries. This is common in labour-
intensive industries, such as clothing. Lead companies in the industry make the specifications. 
They design and/or market the products, but do not make them, and profits in these industries 
derive from high-value research, design, sale, marketing and financial services. The retailers 
have gone from being the main customer of clothing manufacturers to become their 
competitors, through an increased use of imports (Gereffi 1999).  
The distinction between producer-driven and buyer-driven value chains has been 
criticised for not being able to deal sufficiently with value chains that are lacking strong 
control by a lead firm or sufficiently explain the difference between the two types of 
governance structures (Gereffi et al. 2001).  
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Gibbon (2001 in Scott 2006) and Sverrison (2004 in Scott 2006) argue for the need to 
expand the framework with a trader-driven chain. This is to explain the enhanced importance 
of traders, brokers, export-agents and other middlemen in linking producers and buyers. 
These new important roles are to be found in both more advanced and less advanced 
economies in the world. The intermediaries operate from local to global scales, and make it 
economically viable also for small firms to make use of subcontracting services or imports 
from offshore production (Scott 2006). Gereffi et al. (2001) argue that many lead firms have 
changed their focus to product development and marketing, while outsourcing the production 
and production related activities to suppliers.  
A process of „triangle manufacturing‟ can describe the flexible production patterns in 
the clothing industry. Gereffi (1994, 1995, 1996 in Hassler 2003) argues that clothing 
companies from first generation NICs increasingly have taken over the role as middlemen 
between buyers of advanced economies and producers of East and Southeast Asian 
developing countries. The triangle relates to theories of core and periphery where the buyer 
originates from the core, the middleman/agent is of a semi-peripheral node and the clothing 
producer originates from a developing country (Hassler 2003).  
Hassler (2003) argues that earlier theoretisation of global value chains have largely 
been emphasising a homogenous, sectored pattern of clothing production without highlighting 
the similarities/differences among global competitors of different institutional and societal 
contexts. He focuses on how e.g. brand ownership, as one of the critical factors in controlling 
the clothing commodity chain, can also lay with the manufacturer and therefore bring about a 
higher bargaining power on their behalf. Manufacturers basing their company solely on 
production are not seen to obtain higher bargaining power in the value chain. Kalantaridis et 
al. (2008) argue that successful restructuring strategies are likely to move away from actual 
production, and towards branding and consolidation at the retail end of the value chain. The 
aim is to avoid having to compete on price. 
The theory of value chains must not be confused with the assumption that places are 
becoming less significant. It is in fact the opposite. Hudson (2001 in Lier 2007:816) argues 
that since capitalist production is increasingly being relocated; “where production occurs is 
becoming more, rather that less significant”.  
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2.4 Labour and Labour Markets 
To conceptualise a labour market, one can use the definition of Loveridge and Mok 
(1979:27): “those mechanisms and institutions through which the purchase and sale of labour 
power are arranged”. Marxist and classical theory link these mechanisms to the system of 
power and domination in society, as opposed to neo-classical approaches that see labour 
market theories without reference to the societal context. Thus, the first approach will be the 
most relevant in this thesis. The mechanisms that influence supply and demand of labour, 
outlined above, are crucial. 
Tickell and Peck (1992:196) argue that in response to the so-called rigidity in 
production and a reduction of the power of trade unions throughout the world, firms have 
adopted three kinds of flexible labour practices: 
First, traditional collectivist pay bargaining structures have been diffused, gradually 
being replaced by individual negotiations. Secondly, labour is increasingly deployed in a 
range of activities across the shop floor, which stands in sharp juxtaposition to the rigid 
job demarcation spawned by Fordism and the Taylorist division of labour. Thirdly, firms 
are relying upon external adjustments to their labour forces in response to changes in 
demand. Typical strategies include the greater use of part-time staff whose hours can be 
adjusted in line with demand, a growing tendency to hire and fire staff as firm‟s order 
book requires and increased use of subcontracting.  
They argue further that these developments have led to an increased segmentation of labour 
and a weakening of the power of labour to resist capital. As a new type of economic 
geography is appearing with the post-Fordist regimes, one can observe both the emergence of 
new industrial spaces as well as a deepening of the global social and spatial division of 
labour. 
Competition in manufacturing and an increased use of imports may hamper the 
demand for unskilled labour in manufacturing. Nattrass (1998) argues that when this occurs, 
economic theory predicts it will result in a decline in real wage and unskilled manufacturing 
employment will fall. If labour market regulation provides a wage floor, the decline in 
employment will be even sharper. Where trade liberalisation results in increased competition 
from low-wage countries, firms in these product lines will have trouble finding room to 
adjust. In the absence of minimum wages, the response might be to lower product prices by 
reducing labour costs through wage cuts. Where minimum wages prevent this, firms have no 
other option than to increase productivity or simply to cut employment (Nattrass 1998). 
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2.4.1 Segmentation of Labour  
 
According to Braverman (1974), a systematic division of labour is one of the main 
characteristics of capitalist production. Different workers are designated to limited operations 
based on productive skills. Work went from having one social division in primitive societies 
to a new industrial divide. Here, the construction of a product is divided into multiple 
operations executed by different workers. Braverman (1974) argues that the detailed division 
of labour destroys positions. The result is a situation where one worker cannot complete the 
entire production process. Capitalism damages the craft of a process controlled by labour and 
reassembles it as a process under its own control. This way, capitalism gains in two ways; 
higher productivity and tighter administrative control (Braverman 1974). It also results in 
workers being more dependent on capitalists. Braverman (1974) argues further that the 
division of the labour process makes production cheaper for the one who controls the process 
as it can fetch the exact quantity of what is demanded at each stage of production. If the whole 
process was to be executed by one single worker, he would have to inhabit adequate skills and 
knowledge to do the most advanced parts of the work and enough strength to do the heavy 
parts of the work. The capitalist production mode is thus destroying all-round skills where it 
exists, and constructs skills and positions that correspond to capital‟s needs. A distribution of 
knowledge around the production process to the participants is therefore not only 
unnecessary, but also a potential barrier to the functionality of capitalist production. Harvey 
(1982) argues that because of the distinct characteristics of capitalist production, freedom of 
the wage labourer is converted into the exact opposite. When wage labour is the only option, 
the labourer is forced to follow capital, and the freedom of labour is reduced to the freedom of 
capital. 
Traditional labour market segmentation theory tries to understand and conceptualise 
how workers and jobs are not distributed evenly in a universal market. Labour systems vary 
over time, between industries and places, and this variability of labour systems is one of the 
principles that define segmentation theory (Beerepoot 2010). The jobs in a labour market have 
different criteria for hiring, working conditions, wage levels and career prospects, which is 
reflected in the different groups filling the positions. Authors have tried to make 
comprehensive concepts to understand labour market segments. Doeringer and Piore (1971 in 
Beerepoot 2010) differentiate between a primary and a secondary segment of workers. The 
primary segment has well-paid jobs with career prospects and the secondary describes 
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workers with temporary, insecure and badly paid jobs. Carnoy (1980 in Beerepoot 2010) has a 
different approach, with a high-educated segment, a unionized segment and a competitive 
segment in labour markets. The competitive segment reflects the secondary segment, where a 
large pool of poorly educated workers is competing for the unstable and badly paid jobs. The 
unionized segment has jobs where unions have secured structures that regulate employment 
and restrict competition from other workers. A cohesive aspect of segmentation theory is the 
need for labour to be flexible and therefore it is necessary that the core of stable and secure 
employment is balanced by a secondary pool of workers (Beerepoot 2010).  
To include the global aspect of labour segmentation, one would need an expansion of 
the theory. Traditional segmentation theories were also developed at a time when unions had 
a greater bargaining power throughout the world than they do today (Beerepoot 2010). A 
global perspective must complement segmentation theory as to provide a better understanding 
of the world‟s current division of labour. Friedman (2006 in Beerepoot 2010) argues that 
worker‟s vulnerability to international outsourcing is an important classifying aspect. In his 
view, only a small part of the global workforce can secure long-term employment and refuse 
to be a part of the enhanced competition enforced by globalisation. The majority would need a 
large and constant re-investment in skills and knowledge to be able to secure employment in 
global competition. 
2.4.2 A Global Division of Labour 
 
As a way to lower the total cost of production, it is well known that certain industries are 
using strategies of subcontracting and off shoring of production (Fröbel et al. 1980).  This has 
impacted the composition of labour markets locally and globally.  
The global dimension of labour division has become an increasingly important 
characteristic of capitalist production. Taylor and Bryson (2010) discuss new patterns of 
industrial production and employ the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) as an 
explanation for an enhanced relocation of production to low-cost areas. They understand this 
as an inevitable development when the major corporations are increasingly stateless and can 
produce their services where they gain the most profit. The concept of NIDL was first 
developed by Fröbel et al. (1980), and refers to a change from the colonial division of labour 
where production of raw materials in the developing world supported industrialisation in the 
developed world. The changes were made possible as de-colonisation changed traditional 
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social economic structures, leading to a large pool of cheap labour supply in developing 
countries. A fragmentation of the industrial production process allowed the unskilled tasks to 
be relocated, facilitated by developments in transportation and communication technology. 
This resulted in high rates of unemployment and displaced workers in developed countries.  
Fröbel et al. (1980) saw industrialisation in the developing world as highly dependent on 
foreign companies, extremely fragmented and mainly oriented towards the world market. One 
of the driving forces was the new ability of firms to separate labour-intensive from capital-
intensive processes in sectors like textile and clothing. The consequence was that firms were 
able to relocate labour-intensive production to locations characterized by low wages and a 
sufficient and qualified supply of labour. This resulted in a massive exploitation of the 
workforce in the developing world, without particular improvements of the social conditions 
for the population.   
The NIDL-view has been subject to criticism for neglecting agency of the states in 
developing countries, underestimating the levels of industrialisation already present in 
developing countries, and assuming that labour has the same mobility as capital. The NIDL-
view use globalisation as an umbrella-concept, which covers and contains a multitude of 
contradictory and unstructured events, and does not focus on other determining powers 
(Alvstam & Schamp 2005). It was also unable to capture the different industrialisation 
strategies in developing countries, with import substitution on the one hand in e.g. Latin 
America and the rise of NICs with export promotion on the other (Munck 2002). 
Additionally, they have been criticized for assuming that the only way firms can increase their 
profitability and competitiveness is to relocate production to low-cost areas. This would vary 
between industries and companies, and it is within branches where it is difficult to automate 
and mechanize production that relocation is seen as a profitable option (Knutsen 1998).  
Harvey (2006) argue that small geographical differences have gained importance 
rather than been eroded through trade liberalisation and global competition. As outlined 
above, the laws of capitalism make capitalists relocate production to more advantageous sites 
and diverse requirements of different forms of commodity production lead capitalists into 
territorial specialisation. Obvious regional specialisations in production due to different 
resources, differences in infrastructure and built facilities have decisive effects. According to 
Nattrass (1998), labour costs are increasingly important in determining competitive advantage 
in labour-intensive industries, as capital moves ever so freely. Firms in developing countries 
whose wages are not proportional with productivity, will increasingly be out-competed by 
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other low-cost countries. He sees that labour-intensive sectors migrate to low cost areas and 
high productivity sectors with high wages are established in developed countries. 
Lipietz (1997) makes note of the fact that competition between the NICs in Asia and 
Latin America seems capable of imposing one single mode of production regime on the whole 
world: continually lowering wages and even more flexible labour contracts. He argues that 
countries holding on to the classic Fordist wage relation (labour protection in combination 
with the specialisation of tasks) will gradually be outcompeted from both above and below. 
He further sketches out two separate types of labour markets which could operate within the 
same society: either external rigidity of the labour contract including negotiated involvement 
by producers, or external flexibility with direct hierarchical control. The latter resembles a 
Taylorist organisation of working practice, but without the social benefits of Fordism. The 
first will struggle as a result of the rigidity and high costs in routine sectors, and the more 
flexible one will struggle in the sectors requiring the greatest skill. The consequences of the 
outlined labour markets are the following: 
Corollary 1: Those countries practising negotiated employment will attract industries 
with the highest added value (per worker) and those with the greatest skill content. 
Corollary 2: Among these countries, the most competitive will be those where 
involvement is negotiated at the lowest level. 
Corollary 3: There are still countries which are too fordist (too rigid for such an overly 
weak involvement) or with too low a skill level despite extremely low labour costs. In 
such countries exclusion develops, which is to say that the labour supply is of no interest 
to capital (Lipietz 1997:17). 
This shows that in the more skilled sectors one will find the highest salaries, the highest 
qualifications, the greatest internal flexibility, the greatest capacity to introduce new processes 
and to design and test new products. These sectors will be based in those parts of the world 
acting as the centre. In the more routine based sectors, competitiveness can only be 
maintained through more extreme flexibility and lower wages (Lipietz 1997). 
2.5 Summary 
The theoretical approach started with introducing the dynamics of capitalist production: 
Explaining how the system is inherently expansionary, and driven and challenged through 
competition and crises. Labour under capitalism is separated from the means of production 
and sell his/her labour power through waged work under capitalists‟ management. To be of 
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interest for capital investments labour costs cannot inhibit the accumulation process, which 
can result in a recession of capital from the specific area. 
 After a period of Fordist production in the post-war period, the system began breaking 
down due to a fall in productivity, increasing labour costs and higher commodity prices. The 
relations in production were regarded as inflexible, which hampered profit. Subcontracting 
and outsourcing increased as strategies to lower production costs, and wage rates were left to 
the market through the implementation of neo-liberal policies at the world stage. The concept 
of globalisation has been used to explain the functional integration of trade across borders, but 
the literature reveals how the concept cannot be seen separately from the expansion of neo-
liberal policies. 
 The concept of industrial value chains allows for useful thinking about governance in 
industries in global trade, highlighting bargaining power and identifying which activities that 
will deliver increasing profits and which that will not. One can differentiate between 
producer-driven, buyer-driven and trader-driven value chains. 
 The changing production patterns have affected labour market segmentation. As 
production costs have been subjected to competition, so will the cost of labour. Segmentation 
theory uses different terminology to distinguish between a core and a peripheral segment of 
workers, where the latter is competing for insecure and badly paid jobs to balance the stable 
and secure jobs in the core. Segmentation theory has been expanded by theories of a global 
division of labour to include the global aspect in production. The NIDL-view has been 
developed to explain the displacement of work in manufacturing from the developed to the 
developing world, in a search for lower production costs. Labour costs are increasingly 
important in determining competitiveness in labour-intensive industries.   
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3 BACKGROUND 
This chapter will provide background information for the South African context and the 
clothing industry in Durban. As the industry can not be seen isolated from the global clothing 
industry, the chapter will start with a brief introduction to the developments in the clothing 
industry globally, before attention is directed towards the South African transition and the 
industry in Durban.    
3.1 Developments in the Clothing Industry 
The clothing industry is labour-intensive at the production level, and offers jobs for low- and 
semi-skilled workers at an entry level. Simultaneously, the technology level is low, and 
relatively modern technology (from a clothing industry perspective) can be adopted at low 
investment costs. This means that the industry has the potential of being an important job 
creator and is transferrable to less developed countries. As mentioned, the industry can be 
described as relatively „footloose‟, and can adjust quickly to changing market conditions. 
Important competitive factors in the clothing industry are design, marketing, research and 
commodity development (Nordås 2004), which makes it apparent that retail is increasingly 
controlling operations in the value chain. Nordås (2004) argues that this trend first started 
with the establishment of shopping malls in the United States in the 70s. The chain store Wal-
Mart demanded that their suppliers had: 
Information technologies for exchange of sales data, adopted standards for product 
labelling and methods of material handling. This ensured quick replenishment of apparel, 
which in turn allowed the retailer to offer a broad variety of fashion clothes without 
holding a large inventory (Nordås 2004:1).  
While this strategy spread across the world, the competitive advantage of suppliers shifted 
from being just costs to be a combination of cost, lead-time and flexibility. This has again 
given an advantage to suppliers close to major markets. Not only does retail have the power in 
the consumer markets, but they have additionally increased buying power. Many retailers 
have developed their own brands and can source directly from foreign or local suppliers. 
The global clothing industry has gone through dramatic changes in the last decades. 
The shift in sourcing strategies of clothing companies, and especially retail, has in many areas 
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led to a deep restructuring. Firstly, Western countries felt the pressure on production costs to 
chase low-costs production through relocation. To prevent this from eliminating clothing 
industries in the Western world, the MFA was established to protect clothing from free trade 
(see below). Through the phase out, one has been experiencing a second phase of 
restructuring where especially Asian countries, led by China, are increasingly expanding in 
the global market for clothing (Nordås 2004). This is forcing competitive pressure on clothing 
manufacturers throughout the world in a struggle to remain competitive in the value chain, 
and to secure employment in the labour-intensive sector.  
Trade in clothing is long established, but it is the increased global interdependence in 
the last decades that links the industry to theories of global expansion of production. Three 
main factors can be used to explain the global integration of the clothing industry. First, it has 
been facilitated by advances in transportation and information technologies, in combination 
with the spread of neo-liberal policy and trade liberalisation. Secondly, the sector‟s low entry 
barriers regarding capital and skills, and the high labour-intensity, made a relocation of 
production easier compared to other global industries. Finally, it has been affected by the rise 
of retailers, branders and marketers as global buyers (Kalantaridis et al. 2008). The global 
dispersion of the industry can thus relate to the fact that the production process is highly 
fragmented and can easily be exported at all stages of the process. Scott (2006) states that 
even low-wage countries are starting to see that their production expands in even poorer 
countries. Especially the intensified production and exports from China seem to lead to 
negative effects on employment in less developed countries. He continues to argue how a 
further liberalisation of world trade will intensify competition between low-wage countries. 
3.1.1 The Multi-Fibre Agreement  
 
Global trade in clothing and textiles has been heavily protected for more than 40 years with 
the MFA under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later WTO. The 
protection regime ended in January 2005 (Nordås 2004). The MFA was supposed to be a 
temporary agreement for an orderly opening of restricted markets, as to avoid market 
disruptions. The agreement had defined quotas for the quantity possible for exports to the 
global market from each country. This was initiated by the developed world, especially 
United States and European Union, in fear of loosing production to low-cost areas in the 
developing world (Jauch & Traub-Merz 2006). The MFA hampered the possibilities of 
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monopoly in clothing exports, and resulted in numerous developing countries establishing and 
enhancing their capacity in clothing manufacturing. Clothing industry was, under the MFA, 
seen as a typical first-step in industrialisation (Applebaum et al. 2005). Opposition grew 
against the MFA, which was said to violate the principles of the multilateral system in the 
following ways: ”It violated the most favoured nation principle, it applied quantitative 
restrictions rather than tariffs, it discriminated against developing countries, and it was non-
transparent” (Nordås 2004:13). 
After four rounds of negotiation on the MFA status, it expired in 1994. This did not 
mean the end of quotas in clothing and textiles, but a transitory phase-out towards full 
integration of textiles and clothing in the multilateral trade agreement. The period between 
1995 and 2005 was renamed the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). 
According to Jauch and Traub-Merz (2006), the regulations led to a new form of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), which they call „quota hopping‟. When having exhausted the 
quota in one country, companies were searching for possibilities in other countries where they 
could invest to make use of the additional quota. This is one of the reasons why clothing 
production spread to countries that initially did not have their own clothing industry. Trading 
in quotas and the use of subcontractors increased as a way to bypass the quota rules 
(Appelbaum et al. 2005). Giant manufacturers like China used other Asian countries to do the 
finishing of products to make use of both their enormous capacity in clothing manufacturing 
and their large pool of low-skilled workers. Hence, companies needed multiple suppliers to 
profit the most in clothing production under the quota system. This ended with the ATC. 
International buyers could now reduce the number of international suppliers, and determine 
where to buy based on the cheapest price on the international market (Palmi 2007). Still, the 
fragmented value chains continued to dominate the industry (Jauch & Traub-Merz 2006). 
China is seen as the country benefiting the most from the phase out of the ATC/MFA. Jauch 
and Traub-Merz (2006) claims that Chinese clothing and textile exports to the US and the EU 
multiplied in just a few weeks after the quotas were removed.  
3.2 The South African Transition 
South Africa‟s double transition is somewhat unique, where political democratisation 
coincided with economic liberalisation (Bezuidenhout et al. 2008). The democratisation led to 
an intense discussion about what political course to embark on for the country‟s economy and 
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society. Peet (2002) shows how the leading party, African National Congress (ANC), had a 
discursive change in policy approach. The Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), which ANC was grounded on before the election, was written by intellectuals from 
The Economic Trends Group (ET) and The Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG), with 
representatives from other social movements and non-governmental organisations. ET‟s 
members were leftist, union-oriented academics in Johannesburg, University of Natal and 
Cape Town University. MERG had members from the economics department at the 
University of Witwatersrand, with connections to the South African educational system and 
ANC-members in the country. This laid the basis for a post-Keynesian policy framework.  
The RDP had an industrial strategy of increasing national investments - especially in 
manufacturing and job creation, and emphasized the goal of meeting the basic needs of the 
population. It is important to highlight that the policy program mentioned, but did not stress, 
the country‟s integration in the world economy for exports of manufactured goods. Already 
after the election, the white paper was modified from the original RDP: It focused more 
strongly on financial and monetary discipline, the creations of an economic environment that 
encouraged economic growth, and had a more outward orientation in trade and industrial 
policies. This is seen as early signs of reorientation towards more neo-liberal policies, even 
though the ANC continued to commit to RDP‟s policies of reconstruction and sustainable 
development to increase the poor‟s access to resources (Peet 2002). It was also important for 
the new government to make a clear stance when reforming the labour market. Under 
Apartheid, a racial segmentation had governed the South African labour market, and a change 
in labour regulation was an important issue after 1994. This led to the introduction of a 
number of new legislations: Labour Relations Act (LRA), Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act (BCEA), Skills Development Act, Employment Equity Act, and the Unemployment 
Insurance Act. A number of adjustments had to be made by employers to integrate the new 
labour rights (Naidoo 2003). The LRA deals with general labour relations; the right of trade 
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, unfair labour practices, procedures for 
labour dispute, which is sustained through industrial Bargaining Councils (BC) (see 
elaboration below). The BCEA concerns minimums standards of working time, overtime, 
paid leave etc., but most of the standards can vary in the different BC-agreements (Makino 
2008). 
According to Pretorius (2000), the government tried to establish a form of corporatism 
in negotiation through the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), 
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to please both business and union demands. Corporatism can be defined as a “process of 
policy-making and implementation where large interest groups cooperate with each other and 
with public authorities” (Makino 2008:3). NEDLAC is a forum for negotiations between the 
different agents in the industry, state, labour and business, to seek consensus and agreement 
between them on labour market policy before it is introduced in Parliament (Makino 2008). 
This has largely failed, and Pretorius (2000) argues that all three of the above mentioned 
agents have bypassed NEDLAC when dealing with these issues. The unions are pursuing a 
strictly controlled market, business is in favour of a flexible labour market, and government 
has taken the middle road of controlled flexibility. 
South Africa sought membership with the WTO in 1995, which led the country to 
rapidly decrease tariff rates with an even higher speed than what was recommended by the 
WTO. Tariffs are still regarded as relatively high, but the sharp reduction led to an increase in 
imports of both clothing and textiles, mainly from Asia (Gibbon 2002).  
South Africa is also participating in two regional agreements; the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). A new 
agreement with SACU was signed in 2002 by South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland. Its main objectives are to promote the integration of members into the global 
economy; to facilitate cross-border movement of goods; to establish effective, transparent and 
democratic institutions to launch equitable trade benefits; to facilitate equitable sharing of 
revenues from customs, excise and other duties; to promote fair competition, increase 
investments and facilitate economic development; and to facilitate development of common 
policies and strategies. Eleven of SADC member states started to implement a Free Trade 
Area from 2000. The members are South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, 
Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Kirk & Stern 2005). 
3.2.1 Growth, Employment and Restructuring 
 
In 1996, the government embarked on a 4-year policy-program called the Growth, 
Employment and Restructuring program (GEAR). The strategy was developed from the 
approach proposed by the South Africa Foundation and favoured by the National Party before 
democratisation. The government was to speed up privatisation, monetary liberalisation, fiscal 
discipline, and make the labour market more flexible (Bezuidenhout 2000). Peet (2002) 
argues that the move towards neo-liberal policies was a result of pressure from business 
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organisations and media within the country, as well as external pressure from the World Bank 
and IMF. NEDLAC played no role in the formation of the GEAR program (Makino 2008). 
The ANC did not negotiate with its alliance when formulating the GEAR strategy as 
they had done with the previous, post-Keynesian, RDP (Wood 2001), and the GEAR program 
is seen to represent a clear shift in South African policy-making. Peet (2002) argues that the 
underlying premise of GEAR is that South Africa must create the right business climate to 
attract foreign capital investments, as to achieve rapid growth. This would imply an adoption 
of neo-liberal policies.  
GEAR predicted a growth rate of an average of 4,2% for 1996-2000, aiming to tackle 
the country‟s main challenges (Gibbon 2002). Policies aiming to open the economy were 
based on the premise that cutting protection and reducing tariff levels would lead to 
production and exporting according to the country‟s comparative advantage (Roberts 2000). 
Results were disappointing already in the first years after the program was implemented. 
Growth rates were low and unemployment rose. This resulted in a decline in the value of the 
Rand, and the SA Reserve Bank had to stabilise the currency in 2001, leaving it on an 
exchange rate of 12,11 against the US$. This directly affected the clothing industry, as the 
exchange rate favoured imports and constrained exports (Gibbon 2002). Naidoo (2003) argues 
that GEAR failed to accomplish most of its intended goals. They only reached 2,5% growth 
per annum and instead of the promised 400 000 in net job growth annually, they had a 
negative 100 000. He also claims that the cutbacks of the state led to a collapse of investment 
levels rather than attracting private investments. Where the GEAR-program was somewhat 
successful was in bringing down the budget deficit and inflation figures to OECD-levels. 
Income inequality actually worsened from 1991 to 2001, and the labour share of national 
income declined from 57% to 51% in 2001, while capital grew in profit share (Naidoo 2003). 
The combination of the national neo-liberal policy and membership in the WTO led to 
increased pressure on the previously protected industries.  
3.2.2 The African Growth and Opportunity Act 
 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed in 2000 and, as stated by the 
International Trade Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce, “it offers tangible 
incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open up their economies and build 
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free markets”2. The agreement suggests a duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S. market, 
given the country comply with certain criteria. The agreement is divided into two different 
systems of trade regulation, one for developing countries and one for less developed 
countries. For developing countries, it involves a triple transformation rule of origin. This 
means that to make use of the agreement, clothing exports have to use both fabric and yarn 
from other AGOA countries or the U.S. For less developed countries, the agreement demands 
only a single transformation rule, which is simple local manufacturing with no specific 
national source of fabric or yarn (Gibbon 2002). South Africa qualified as a developing 
country, while fellow members in both SACU and SADC mainly qualified as less developed 
countries. The agreement was supposed to lead to greater export opportunities for clothing 
exporters in South Africa, but as manufacturers have had problems qualifying their exports 
within the complex rules of origin, only a minor part has in practise been able to benefit from 
the agreement (Barnes 2005). 
3.2.3 The Clothing Industry in South Africa 
 
South African clothing production has traditionally been strong, providing both industrial and 
employment opportunities. The country has been the site of the continent‟s largest clothing 
industry for more than half a century. Before 1994, the clothing industry in South Africa was 
highly protected through the system of import substitution with an extensive use of tariffs. 
This resulted in a low level of specialisation, and the distribution of production between 
different lines of products basically corresponded to national demand (Gibbon 2002). Due to 
the apartheid system, South Africa was to a certain extent isolated from integration in global 
trade, which meant a longer period of import substitution. The most important instrument for 
import substitution in the clothing industry was a large and complex system of protection. 
Altman (1997 in Gibbon 2002) states that there were about 2000 different clothing and textile 
tariff rates in the 1980s. Some of them were even introduced to protect individual firms.  
During the years of protection clothing manufacturers more or less held the power in 
the value chain. Even though there were some imports, the market was basically closed with 
both export and import levels below 10 % (Gibbon 2002). After joining the WTO, South 
Africa was not forced to implement a structural adjustment program designed by the IMF, but 
their national policy embarked on a fierce route of trade liberalisation. For a short while, 
                                                 
2 http://www.agoa.gov/ 
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clothing companies managed to invest in modern technology, supported by a depreciation of 
the Rand, and to stay competitive against imports. Since 2002, the industry has gone in to a 
phase of restructuring; the value of local currency has appreciated and production costs have 
simultaneously increased (Gibbon 2002).  
3.3 The Durban Industry  
The clothing industry in South Africa was mainly focusing on the domestic market before 
liberalisation, and is now experiencing great challenges in terms of competitiveness in both 
the global and the domestic market. Particularly China poses a huge threat to the industry, 
having both cheaper production costs and a more efficient production (Jauch & Traub-Merz 
2006). The industry was traditionally concentrated around the areas of Johannesburg, Cape 
Town and Durban. It expanded in Durban because of large reserves of Indian and “Coloured” 
labour. The Durban clothing industry is broader than the other two, aiming at a lower marked-
segments customer base, and mostly wholesale trade (Gibbon 2002).   
The ongoing restructuring in the Durban industry can be characterized as a crisis due 
to large changes in the traditional relations of production and employment. There has been a 
rapid decline in regulated employment as companies are downsizing, relocating and closing. 
Employment in registered enterprises in South Africa has declined by over 40% from 1995 
until 2001, and within the Durban area, the fall reached 55% (Gibbon 2002).  
The national Bargaining Council differentiate between metro- and non-metro areas in 
KwaZulu-Natal, with two distinct sets of labour regulations. The regulations of the metro area 
in Durban are applicable for establishments situated within the Magisterial Districts of 
Chatsworth, Durban, Inanda, Lower Tugela, Pietermaritzburg and Pinetown, while those of 
the non-metro areas cover all establishments in KwaZulu-Natal outside the mentioned metro 
areas (NBC 2010). The job losses are particularly severe in the metro areas, but even in non-
metro areas where wages are substantially lower, one can see a considerable decline. This 
indicates the extent of the pressure on the industry. In addition to regulated companies, 
Durban has a growing unregulated sector in clothing. These are mainly smaller manufacturers 
producing outsourced orders (Skinner & Valodia 2002).  
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3.3.1 The Manufacturers in Durban 
 
Clothing manufacturing in Durban is characterized by a small number of large corporations 
with full manufacturing facilities, a large number of small suppliers doing Cut, Make and 
Trim-operations (CMTs), and an increasing number of trading houses/buying houses/design 
houses. To simplify, the latter will be referred to as trading houses. 
Full manufacturers produce in-house, and can have their own design centres or their 
own brand. They are increasingly outsourcing their orders locally, to neighbouring countries 
or Asia, and receive their orders through retailers or trading houses (Gibbon 2002).  
CMTs do not perform the whole production, but manufacture outsourced orders from 
full manufacturers or trading houses (Gibbon 2002). This makes them highly dependent on 
their local network and reputation to receive orders. They may have direct contact with under-
affiliates in retail or brands, but this is less frequent. The segment of CMTs emerged already 
in the 1960s, when large retailers sourced directly from manufacturers and helped them set up 
specific CMT operations. A decade later, large manufacturers themselves started using CMTs 
to ride off season peaks and complement their own production if assistance was needed.  In 
the 1990s this took a step even further, when medium-sized manufacturers specialized in 
design, marketing, finishing and merchandising, or converted into so-called trading houses 
(see below), while their previous technicians and machinists formed a CMT or just Make and 
Trim. Additionally, a number of unregulated CMTs emerged as a result of the closures of 
many larger companies. There are limited possibilities to upgrade from CMT-operations to 
full manufacturer, as technology levels tend to be very low, and working capital is close to 
non-existent (Gibbon 2002). According to Morris et al. (2001), 320 out of approximately 416 
clothing companies in Durban are CMTs, demonstrating the importance of CMTs in the 
industry. 
Trading houses get orders from retail, and they are tasked with finding a suitable (read 
cheap) factory to do the actual production. There is an increasing number of trading houses 
establishing in Durban, or converting from manufacturers to trading houses. Trading houses 
work closely with retail, either cooperating on the design operations, or presenting their own 
designs to the customer in retail (Gibbon 2002). They do not perform actual production, and 
thus do not offer the entry level and low skilled jobs as those of manufacturers.  
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3.3.2 Bargaining Council Negotiations 
 
Negotiations regarding labour market regulations take place in the BC 
 
for the clothing 
industry
3
, with representatives from the trade union and the employer body. The regulations 
are to be followed by all manufacturers in the industry even without membership in an 
employer organisation (Nattrass 2000, Makino 2008). The rates differentiate between the 
metro area and non-metro area, with the latter being significantly lower (Gibbon 2002). To 
exemplify the wage difference, a qualified cutter in a metro area will have a weekly wage of 
694,75 R (NBC 2009 (1)), while a qualified cutter in a non-metro area will earn 406 R weekly 
(NBC 2009 (2)).  
The main objectives of the national bargaining activities are a strengthening of 
national bargaining structures, wages, organisational rights, member benefits, retirement fund 
provisions, primary health care, and the consolidation of organization in non-metro areas
4
. 
There has to be three parties in the negotiations and if the union and the employer 
organization cannot come to an agreement, the result will not be approved. According to 
Gibbon (2002), employment in companies registered in the BC declined by 40% from 1995 to 
2001. He further argues that the decline reflects that around 200 companies have gone 
underground to reduce their costs, and not actual employment loss. The loss could also 
correspond to manufacturers converting to trading houses. 
Currently, the BC is struggling with a large amount of non-compliant companies and, 
as the regulations are to cover all companies in the region, the council is tasked with having to 
reveal and prosecute the non-compliant companies (NBC 2010).  
3.3.3 The Trade Union 
 
The South African Clothing and Textile Workers‟ Union (SACTWU) was formed in 1989 as 
a part of a broader trend for non-racial, and politically connected, general unions in contrast to 
the earlier trend of more apolitical unions divided along industrial and racial lines (Gibbon 
2002). SACTWU is under the umbrella federation The Congress of South African Trade 
                                                 
3 For further information on the main agreement, view the BC’s website:  
Metro: http://www.nbc.org.za/jun2010_updates/Part%20C%20-
%20KZN%20Region_19%20Mar%2010.pdf,  
Non-metro: http://www.nbc.org.za/jun2010_updates/Part%20I%20-%20Non-
Metro_19%20Mar%2010.pdf  
4 http://www.sactwu.org.za/collective-bargaining 
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Unions (COSATU), with 21 member unions 
5
 and 1,770,155 members in 2003 (Naidoo 
2003). COSATU is in a tripartite alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP). The Alliance involves cooperation towards the establishment of a democratic 
and non-racial South Africa, economic transformation and continued process of political and 
economic democratisation
6
.  
SACTWU is the largest union in the clothing, textile and leather industry in South 
Africa and the sixth largest affiliate of COSATU. They had 99 000 members in June 2010
7
. 
The union is in often assumed to be more powerful than the employer organisation in 
promoting their members‟ interests in labour law negotiation, as the government has tended to 
ignore business demands on core aspects of labour legislation (Pretorius 2000). Makino 
(2008) argues that the LRA reflected more of the demands of labour than of business in areas 
were labour and business disputed. Still, the union has experienced a continued loss of 
membership, due to relocation, downsizing, retrenchments and the like (Skinner & Valodia 
2002). 
3.3.4 The Employer Body 
 
In the national main agreement on clothing, the employer body is represented by 7 different 
employer organisations: Cape Clothing Association, Consolidated Association of Employers 
of Southern Africa Region, Eastern Province Clothing Manufacturers' Association, Free State 
and Northern Cape Clothing Manufacturers' Association, Natal Clothing Manufacturers' 
Association (NCMA), Northern Decentralised Clothing Manufacturers‟ Association, and 
Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers' Association (NBC 2010). In KwaZulu-Natal, the NCMA 
is the main representative for employers. The employer body has lost membership due to lack 
of compliance in the Durban-region, and the remaining members are mainly large 
manufacturers (Nattrass 2000). In the NCMA, what used to be a membership of 220 firms has 
been reduced to 16. When interviewing the organisation leader, he has a condescending tone 
towards the union, expressing that they lack education and skills to understand the dynamics 
and competition in the industry (NCMA representative 11.05.10). This is reflecting Pretorius‟ 
(2000) observation that business is struggling with an inflexible labour market in an 
environment of global competition. 
                                                 
5 http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/misc/2009/structure.pdf 
6 http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051 
7 http://www.sactwu.org.za/ 
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4 RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter will outline the methodological premises on which the thesis is based on. It is 
important that the principles grounding a research project are explicitly defined. According to 
Thagaard (2009), this is done by highlighting and illustrating the processes leading to research 
results, which will be the aim of the following chapter. 
4.1 The Qualitative Method 
Qualitative research methods have traditionally been characterized by a close contact between 
the researcher and the research object. The methods try to deepen understandings and 
emphasize meaning, instead of reach and numbers like that of quantitative research. Hence, 
the qualitative approach focuses on processes and phenomena that are not possible to measure 
in quantity or frequency. The outcome of qualitative analysis is often analytical descriptions 
instead of statistical generalisations, which describe the result of quantitative methods 
(Thagaard 2009). Analytical descriptions have the goal of combining the specific empirical 
findings with theory, and discuss these in the light of theoretical approaches (Yin 1994). 
Qualitative research wishes to create an understanding of various social phenomena, and 
interpretation is an important aspect in qualitative research projects.  
The choice of qualitative methods implies a certain understanding of truth and reality. 
The philosophy of phenomenology focuses on experience and the world of the living. It 
highlights the importance of understanding phenomena through the perspective of the agent 
and sees reality as the one perceived by humans (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). Thagaard (2009) 
stresses that phenomenology has the subjective experience as its point of departure and seek 
to understand the deeper meaning behind the individual experience of the informant. 
Hermeneutics emphasize the importance of an interpretation of people‟s actions by focusing 
on further understanding than what is instantly visible. This approach highlights that a fixed 
truth does not exist, as a phenomenon has several levels of interpretation (Thagaard 2009). 
The hermeneutic view of interpretation lays the basis for the critical theoretical approach 
taken in this thesis.  
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4.1.1 Critical Theory 
 
Interpretation has a striking position in critical theory, which highlights the revealing of 
ideology and takes a critical stand towards the established social structures. By finding 
interpretive inspiration and ideas from metatheoretical perspectives, critical theory places 
phenomena and actions in a wider context (Thagaard 2009). Critical theory is relevant to this 
thesis as I wish to use the data material to shed light on global structures of economic activity 
and value chains through the local context of Durban. Connecting the empirical data with 
metatheories of capitalist production and the relation between capital and labour is also an 
important goal in this regard. The triple hermeneutic of critical theory (Alvesson & Sköldberg 
1994 in Thagaard 2009) has an important position in explaining how the interpretation 
develops. The single hermeneutic refers to the informant‟s interpretation of himself and his 
reality. A double hermeneutic explains how the researcher interpret this reality, while the 
triple hermeneutic of critical theory contains this double hermeneutic and a critical 
interpretation of the social conditions that both the informant and the researcher are 
influenced by. The approach focuses on processes that promote certain interests at the 
expense of others, which is in close relation to the theories of governance in industrial value 
chains, competition and the dynamics of capitalist production.  
4.1.2 The Qualitative Research Interview 
 
The method of qualitative research interviews is based on the assumption that the world‟s 
processes and phenomena have to be described before one can develop theories of them, and 
be understood before one can explain them. The interview is one of the most used qualitative 
methods. With few rigid rules defined beforehand, many decisions must be settled in the 
actual interview situation (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). Hence, the researcher is granted great 
freedom, but is also confronted with many challenges. 
The interview provides a good starting point to receive knowledge about individuals‟ 
experiences and have them reflect on their own situations (Thagaard 2009). The chosen 
research method should reflect the research questions of a given project. As I wanted to get 
my informants‟ perspective on changes and dynamics within the industry, as well as strategies 
they use to confront the challenge of change, the qualitative interview was the most viable 
way to get the detailed information I was searching for. Through the qualitative interview, one 
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can see the world from the informants‟ point of view, bring forth their experiences and reveal 
their perceptions. The interview is a professional conversation where knowledge is 
constructed through interplay between the researcher and the informant. This knowledge is 
influenced by the technique used in the interview as well as in the process of analysing. Thus, 
the conversation is not symmetrical, as the researcher has defined the theme, developed the 
questions and controls the conversation. Additionally, the researcher generally does not 
contribute with his/her own attitudes on the subject. As the statements from the informants are 
related to their specific context and sensitive to qualitative differences, one needs thorough 
descriptions of the contextual aspects in the analysis (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  Therefore, I 
chose to include a detailed background chapter to highlight the Durban context.  
4.2 Doing Fieldwork and Handling Data Material 
4.2.1 The Research Object 
 
The research object of this study is the clothing industry in Durban, in the context of global 
competition. Durban is situated in the metro area of KwaZulu-Natal, already defined by the 
Bargaining Council. The labour regulations are the same throughout the metro area, but 
challenges and possibilities might differ as Durban is the largest city in the region and an 
important harbour in South Africa. I chose my research object believing that a study of an 
African middle-income country can add valid contributions to the vast research field of 
industrial relations in the clothing industry. Additionally, South Africa presents an interesting 
study as the country has implemented policies aiming at liberalising trade while protecting 
labour through regulations (Müller 2004, Makino 2008). As mentioned, the Durban area is an 
exciting point of departure as it is concentrated on mass-production and thus in direct 
competition with other low-cost areas. Numbers on job losses and company closures also 
reveal that Durban is one of the areas in South Africa that is struggling the most to find a 
sustainable structure for further clothing production (Gibbon 2002, Barnes 2005). By 
exploring the reasons behind the deteriorating competitiveness of companies and the local 
response, Durban might shed light to whether there are any conflicts in the relation between 
trade liberalisation and labour regulations in a labour-intensive industry. 
40 
 
I stayed in Durban from the beginning of May to mid-July 2010 with Ana Veronica 
Roman, who did her fieldwork in the same industry on the case of co-operatives. We also did 
pilot interviews on each other to make sure that our guides were comprehensible and had a 
logical dramaturgy. During our stay I performed 15 in-depth interviews: one with a trading 
house, one with a representative from the union SACTWU, one with a representative from the 
employer organisation NCMA, one with two representatives from the Bargaining Council, 
one with a consultant of textile and clothing companies, one with a manufacturer of 
interlining for the clothing industry, one with an official from the EThekwini municipality, 
five with CMT manufacturers, three with large manufacturers, as well as two conversations 
with my contact in the Chamber of Commerce in Durban. As shown, my informants are 
mostly manufacturers, but representatives from important institutions connected to the 
industry are also included. This gave me the opportunity to get differing and conflicting views 
on the status of the industry. The interviews lasted between half an hour and three hours, 
depending on the schedule of the informants and how thorough they were in their answers. 
Some of them set time limits in advance, but the interviews were mostly around two hours. 
4.2.2 The Interview Guide 
 
When entering the field I had a theoretical framework based on secondary literature and an 
interview guide with between 60-70 questions under specific themes. According to Kvale and 
Brinkmann (2009), the researcher needs a solid theoretical background to ask the right 
questions that one would need to build the analysis after a completed fieldwork. Still, the 
interview guide reflected that I had not made any preliminary conclusions before starting to 
collect the empirical data. As the interviews aimed at capturing the perspective of the 
informants, I wanted to leave it up to them to guide the central point of the conversation, but 
at the same time be sure that I did not leave out important aspects. When noticing the focus of 
the specific informant, I could follow up with questions related to that specific theme. This 
reflects Kvale and Brinkmann‟s (2009) perception that the work with the interview guide can 
be seen as a circular process. They see that new discoveries can lead to the need to change or 
expand the interview guide. One of my last questions was if they had something to add or if I 
had forgotten anything important, to allow for the informant to include other issues that I was 
not aware of. Even though I kept a similar interview guide throughout the fieldwork, follow 
up questions and the weight of the interviews were different.  
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I worked out two different interview guides, one for manufacturers and one for 
informants from various organisations connected to the industry (the first is attached as 
appendix). The latter had more general and overarching questions, leaving out those related to 
specific structure and strategies of companies. The guides started with simple and neutral 
questions regarding informant background and company/industry facts, leading up to more 
detailed questions about industry dynamics and challenges. By the end of the guide, the 
questions were simpler again, as to tone down the complexity and round off the interview. 
One of these questions would be how the informant perceived the future of the industry and 
the company. These kinds of open-ended questions to finish off an interview can bring out 
additional and interesting reflections from the informant. According to Thagaard (2009), the 
order of questions is decisive for the progress of the interview. To start with neutral questions 
about the informant or the relevant theme help building up trust between the researcher and 
the informant.  
While working on the interview guide I also had to change several words when finding 
out which were relevant in the Durban context, and to avoid words with a negative 
connotation. An example would be that I chose to use the word outsourcing instead of 
subcontracting, as the latter is perceived more sensitive while the first is well established 
amongst manufacturers in Durban. These may seem as small and irrelevant details, but the 
smallest mistake on behalf of the researcher can break the trust of the informant (Thagaard 
2009). A well performed research interview needs to balance the spontaneous and the 
structured, or in Thagaard‟s (2009) words; the systematic and the empathic. I felt that this 
balance was successfully obtained in my interviews, and generally had a good connection 
with all my informants.  
4.2.3 The Field and the Informants 
 
To enter an unknown field is challenging. I started exploring the field while still in Oslo, and 
managed to establish a contact with the Durban Chamber of Commerce. He introduced me, by 
email, to a consultant for the textile and clothing companies with more than 30 years of 
experience from the clothing industry. These were the only two contacts I had when leaving 
Oslo for Durban. The consultant had established an interview for me the day after our arrival 
in Durban and also gave me a great overall introduction to the local industry by email. The 
contact at the Chamber of Commerce also gave me several important contacts in the industry. 
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These contacts assisted me with new informants. This method of attaining informants can be 
explained as the snowball method. The method often starts with contacting a few people with 
the relevant characteristics for the research questions. After the interviews, one would get 
suggestions from them about other possible informants. A challenge with this method is that 
the selection of informants might come from the same network or group (Thagaard 2009). In 
my case, the contact from Chamber of Commerce was particularly aware of this and gave me 
four contacts from distinct parts of the industry, pointing out how these four would give me 
different perspectives on the restructuring. You can never get completely away from possible 
bias with this method, as one could always question if the snowball method has excluded 
important informants. 
 The informant from the Chamber of Commerce could be seen as a combination of a 
key informant and a gatekeeper. A key informant is an informant who gives the researcher 
especially good insight into the issue in question. A gatekeeper is an informant with the power 
to open or block access to a field or an organisation. This person could also be one the 
researcher discusses impressions from the fieldwork with (Thagaard 2009). I would not say 
that the informant from the Chamber of Commerce could have blocked access into the 
industry, but he made the entrance a lot easier, especially with the Bargaining Council, and it 
would have taken time to find the other informants on my own. We discussed some of my 
impressions over the phone and had two short meetings discussing the industry, which I found 
very helpful. The consultant also had some of the qualities of a key informant in the overview 
of the industry that he gave me.  
I also found it very useful to have a name reference when contacting a new informant. 
From the initial suggestions given by the contact in the Chamber of Commerce, I got new 
suggestions for informants. Most of my informants were obtained using this method, but I 
also contacted individual companies by email and phone, after a web-based search or by 
getting to know the company name in an earlier interview. I found this to be more 
challenging, as I lacked a name reference, but it still got me a few additional interviews.  
My field partner, Ana Veronica Roman, assisted me in landing an interview with the 
trade union, and hence functioned as a gatekeeper. She had worked closely with the union for 
several weeks while I was focusing on manufacturers. I did not want to be related to the union 
before my interviews with the manufacturers were done. It turned out to be more difficult than 
expected to get entrance in the union. After several phone calls and visits without luck, 
Roman helped me setting up an appointment for the interview.  
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 My reflections on how contact was established with the informants show that a lot is 
coincidental and it is hard to plan your fieldwork from home. Many aspects of an unknown 
field are impossible to figure out through article reading in advance and, with the defined time 
span available, one must have faith in these coincidences.  
4.2.4 Performing the Interviews 
 
I used a dictaphone in all my interviews except one that was done in a public place were 
sound recording was impossible. Simultaneously, I took notes to be able to include reactions 
and body language that cannot be recorded. According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), a lot 
of the knowledge created in an interview is not actual words. None of my informants reacted 
negatively to the dictaphone - it seemed to be expected in the interview situation.  
All the interviews, except the above mentioned, were performed in the informants‟ 
offices. Thagaard (2009) argues that it is important to reflect on how the place of the 
interview may affect the situation and in which situations the informant would feel free to talk 
about the relevant subjects. In my case, most interviews were performed during the workday, 
and it would have been an inconvenience for them to leave the company. At the same time, 
me coming to them showed respect for their time and could also make them feel more 
comfortable when sharing information in their own environment. As I did not ask questions 
about working conditions, the informants did not seem to find it uncomfortable to do the 
interviews inside the company. It also broadened my experience as I was often shown around 
the factories, met with workers, and was shown garment samples. 
During the interview with the Bargaining Council, I met with two informants 
simultaneously. Since I did not know in advance about my informant‟s choice of including a 
colleague, I thought at first that this would lead to additional challenges in controlling the 
interview. It turned out to be a surprisingly good solution. With two informants, the questions 
turned into a discussion, they corrected each other when disagreeing and filled in on each 
other‟s answers. It also gave the situation more of a conversational feel. However, one can not 
be sure that the information provided from the interview would have turned out differently if 
only one informant had been present, even though I felt that the situation was positive for the 
outcome of the interview. 
Most of the informants were men, significantly older than me, and company leaders. 
Hence, the issue of corporate interviews and control is relevant. Schoenberger (1991) states 
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that when doing interviews based on research of e.g. firm behaviour, the power relation may 
turn out somewhat different than what is the case in many other types of interviews. 
Normally, one would be concerned if the researcher is exerting excessive control over the 
informant. When performing corporate interviews the researcher is at risk of losing control. 
This is caused by the fact that these informants are often used to be in control and exert 
authority over others, and might wish to impose their own agenda during the interview. 
During some of the interviews this was an issue, and I had to concentrate on keeping in 
control and steer the interview when it moved in unwanted directions. In one of the interviews 
I was actually shushed at for asking a new question as the informant had his own plan for how 
the interview was supposed to turn out. But interviewing is a learning process and it taught 
me how to be able to control the interview without the informant feeling I was cutting him 
off. I felt that I managed to keep the necessary control in most of the interviews.  
Thagaard (2009) argues that gender and age are some of the features that may affect 
the outcome of the interviews. I found these differences to work both for and against me. It 
worked „against me‟ in the way that I had to focus on staying in control, and that I had to 
prove to the informants that I had knowledge about the industry. They worked „for me‟ as my 
informants perceived me as less of a threat and felt they could be honest and teach me a lot. If 
I had given the impression that I already knew everything about the industry, they would not 
have given me so thorough descriptions. Still, I made an effort in looking as professional as 
possible before the interviews so that I would be taken seriously.       
4.2.5 Transcribing the Data Material 
 
The interviews from Durban left me with many hours of sound recording. Due to the limited 
time span of the master thesis, I chose to categorise the material before transcribing. This 
methodological choice implies an early interpretation of which parts of the data material that 
would be of interest in the analysis. The categorisation was influenced by what the informants 
had made clear were the most important issues in the industry, as well as my interview guide. 
I made a division of eight themes: Causes for restructuring, strategies/changes, competition, 
outsourcing, relocation, labour regulations, institutions (government, union, bargaining 
council), and perceptions of the future. This categorisation allowed me to filter out the 
relevant information, and was also time saving as I did not transcribe all of my material. 
Additionally, it gave me a good overview of the material when analysing, as the information 
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from the sound recordings was placed in the relevant category. One might argue that the 
categorisation excluded new approaches in the analysis, but the categorisation was made after 
finishing the fieldwork, and was a necessary choice to be able to finish my thesis at standard 
time. I listened through all of my material before deciding what to transcribe.  
4.3 Reliability and Validity 
The concept of reliability is debated within qualitative studies, as the concept is considered 
related more appropriately to quantitative studies than qualitative. This has made researchers 
in qualitative studies fill the concept with different meaning, making it hard to give a short 
answer to a project‟s reliability (Golafshani 2003). Reliability originally questions whether 
another researcher using the same methods would end up with the same result, if it is possible 
to replicate the research project. As the method of qualitative research interviews is based on 
the premise that the data is a result of an interaction between the researcher and the informant 
in the interview situation, the question of replicating a project is irrelevant. Hence, the 
question of reliability in qualitative studies is better connected with whether or not the 
researcher is clear and thorough in his/her explanations about the methodological choices 
(Thagaard 2009). Throughout the process I have been conscious about the context in which 
my data has been collected, as well as having different types of informants to support or reject 
information from others. I believe my reflections in the presented methodological chapter 
would give a clear description of my methodological choices and thus answer the question of 
reliability. 
 Validity is linked to interpretation of the data material, and whether or not the 
researcher‟s interpretations are representative for the studied reality (Thagaard 2009). Seale 
(1999 in Thagaard 2009) differentiates between internal and external validity. The internal 
validity refers to how causal relations are supported within the study. The aim of the thesis is 
to understand how changes in global production systems are affecting the clothing industry in 
Durban. By presenting a broad theoretical approach and connecting these theories with 
information from my informants in the analysis, I believe that I have made the causal relations 
within the study clear and comprehensible for the reader. This is also done through the 
structure of the analysis, with one part analysing constraints to competitiveness and the other 
analysing the response in Durban. Additionally, I have been thorough in demonstrating which 
parts of my analysis that are based on empirical data and which are grounded on theory and 
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secondary sources. The aim of the conclusion is to further clarify the basis of my 
interpretations. 
 External validity is connected to transferability, meaning if and how the understanding 
developed in a study can have relevance for similar studies in other contexts (Thagaard 2009). 
One could argue that the understandings from this thesis might be transferable to other 
studies, as it comprises an interpretation of competitiveness and local responses in labour-
intensive production. The challenges in competitiveness are likely to be present in other 
geographical contexts as well as other labour-intensive industries, but the response from 
manufacturers might differ as the possibilities for restructuring are more contextually defined. 
The concept of transferability will also be highlighted in my conclusion. 
4.4 Ethical Reflections 
Ethical reflections should be integrated in all phases of the research project as the interplay 
affects the persons involved and the knowledge created in the interviews. Kvale and 
Brinkman (2009) argue that the most important issues are informed consent, confidentiality, 
consequences and the role of the researcher. These are to be reflected on before, during and 
after the research interview.  
4.4.1 Informed Consent 
 
According to Thagaard (2009), informed consent must be obtained from all the informants 
before starting the project. They should also be informed of the right to withdraw from the 
project at any stage of the research, and know of possible benefits or disadvantages that could 
appear from contributing to the project (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  
I contacted my informants on the phone beforehand to inform about the project, who I 
was, and what kind of information they could assist me with. At the actual interview I would 
emphasize that participation was voluntary. Fortunately, the informants were helpful and 
appeared to view the interview as a positive experience. As the interviews did not ask for any 
personal information, but had a theme related approach, none of the informants felt that the 
interview situation was intimidating or very challenging. My questions evolved around their 
business, possibilities and challenges in the environment they operate in. As the industry is 
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very well aware of its own struggle, the informants did not consider my questions sensitive. It 
was clear to me that they understood their role in the project.  
4.4.2 Confidentiality 
 
All informants participating in a project have the right to be sure that all given information is 
treated with confidentiality (Thagaard 2009). According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) 
private data that can reveal the identity of informants should not be included in the project. 
Even if the informants agree on using their own identity in the research, the researcher must 
reflect on what consequences this could bring upon the informant. 
 In the project, it was never problematic to keep my informants anonymous. Again this 
relates to the aim of the research - to understand the dynamics of the industry. In presenting 
the views of the industry, I refer to my informants according to what kind of manufacturer 
they are or what kind of institution they represent. The informants were not informed about 
whom else I was interviewing, but most of the time they knew about some of the others 
because of the snowball method applied. I also met several informants when participating at a 
workshop led by the Bargaining Council. At the same time, the struggles of the industry and 
the challenges they are experiencing are mostly out in the open, so that knowing of other 
informants would not lead to any disadvantages.   
4.4.3 Consequences 
 
It is the responsibility of the researcher to make sure that there are no negative consequences 
of participating in the project, hence this should be reflected on before pursuing the interview 
(Thagaard 2009). The informants did not see any negative consequences of being involved in 
the project, and they were all extremely helpful both in providing information and by assisting 
me in contacting other relevant informants. When I was denied assistance, it was due to time 
constraints, and not because they did not want to participate. One could also say that some of 
the informants found it relieving to talk freely about the difficulties they felt in the industry, 
and use their own experiences to illustrate the situation.  
One potential informant refused to do the interview because he was on the verge of 
being shut down by the Bargaining Council. Therefore, he did not want to attract negative 
attention to the factory or talk to anybody about his situation. In these situations it could be 
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tempting to persuade an informant to do the interview regardless of his concerns, because it 
could reveal interesting information about why the company is being forced to shut down. But 
as it is the researcher‟s responsibility to protect the informants, it would not have been an 
option to ask him to do the interview without knowing what consequences this could have for 
his business. The informant was still very helpful and gave me the phone number of another 
informant in the same type of company. 
4.4.4 The Role of the Researcher 
 
Thagaard (2009) claims that if the researcher is associated with a category already known by 
the informant, such as social worker, journalist or a leader, this can disturb the interview and 
lead to the informant having expectations to the researcher that he/she is not competent to 
fulfil. These complications can be avoided by making sure the informant knows your, and his, 
role in the interview. It was important for me to be clear about who I was and what my project 
was about; a student writing a master thesis, and not somebody who could change their world. 
Some asked if I was a journalist, and others thought I wanted to work in the clothing industry 
after finalising the project. To avoid such misunderstandings I always started the interview by 
explaining my project, what university I came from and the field of human geography. My 
last question in the interview would also be if they wanted to ask me something, so that if 
there still were some ambiguity about the project or my status, we would clear that off before 
finishing. They often wanted to know more about my studies, human geography and why I 
had chosen to study this particular industry. Some of them also expressed interest in where 
my results would be published, and I had to explain to them that my thesis would be 
published on the university website DUO, and that I hoped to write some articles on the 
theme as a spin-off but that this was not guaranteed. When one informant said: „Go get them‟, 
after the interview, it was clear that I had to explain my purpose and the project again. One 
can never be completely sure that the informants have understood where you as a researcher 
are coming from, but it is important to make this information as clear as possible and an 
integrated part of the interview. If not, you might end up disappointing your informants at a 
later stage.  
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5 CONSTRAINTS TO COMPETITIVENESS 
The chapter is related to the first research question: What are the factors that deteriorate 
competitiveness of the manufacturers in the industry, and how do these affect their position in 
the value chain? The chapter is subdivided into two, though highly interrelated, parts; 
„External Factors‟ and „Internal Factors‟.  
5.1 External factors  
As explored in the theoretical chapter, changes in production and sourcing patterns altered 
international trade extensively. Not only did it open up for a spread of production sites, but 
brought additional links in the value chain of clothing. These changes in the global 
environment of trade and manufacturing are experienced in Durban through loss of 
employment and heavy restructuring. Many Western, former manufacturing, countries have 
progressed to post-manufacturing societies as new sourcing strategies have developed. It is 
argued that industrialisation often begins with labour-intensive industries, because of low 
entry barriers that absorb unemployed labour and contribute in economic development (Jauch 
& Traub-Mertz 2006). When the economy advances, so does the industrial focus. As labour 
costs and competence enhance, the economy will move towards production and services of 
higher value and more advanced technology, while the labour intensive industries will move 
to other low-cost areas. South Africa, still in transition, finds itself slipping between two 
chairs. On the one hand, the growing economy is advancing to more capital-intensive 
industries, but on the other hand, a large part of the labour force is low- or semi-skilled and 
therefore in desperate need of the positions offered by the industry (Nattrass 1998). Hence, 
one can observe that South Africa is becoming highly segmented, both the economy and the 
labour market. The government is struggling to satisfy the total of South African needs, and 
especially to continue the creation of low- and semi-skilled employment in the advancing 
economy. 
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5.1.1 From Isolation to Globalisation 
 
Durban has a long tradition in clothing production, which developed and grew in a protected 
market. As other countries and regions were gradually exposed to increased trade and 
functional global integration, South Africa was thrown into global competition decades later. 
The massive shifts in trade and competition occurred faster than what had happened with 
clothing production in a large part of the developed world. One can observe the same 
dynamics of industrial restructuring in e.g. Europe, but to understand the South African 
context, the time-perspective should be considered. South African production had been 
protected and isolated through the apartheid era and, when opening up to free trade, flexible 
production and sourcing patterns were already the norm in global trade. As highlighted 
through theories of Fordism and post-Fordism, this development started more than 15 years 
earlier in the Western world. A clothing producer explains the dynamic in the closed economy 
as follows:  
Before 1994 it was a closed economy with high protection to imports. So the duty level 
was in excess of 120 % on ready-made garment if you wanted to import. And because it 
was a closed economy you were able to offset your writing costs to your import cost 
immediately to the retailer who was a silent buyer. And the retailer was in turn able to 
put it on to the customer that was a silent customer. That was the closed economy (Large 
manufacturer 24.05.10). 
The manufacturer refers to retail as silent buyers; in the way that they did not state demand 
upon production, but the cost of production was reflected in the prices offered to consumers. 
Because the industry was built up under isolation, and with the domestic manufacturers 
driving production and prices, it was never able to achieve economies of scale (Barnes 2005). 
Durban was therefore less competitive when opening up to free trade, as it did not fit within 
the local industrial frame. For the South African context, not only did the country experience 
trade liberalisation but, as explained in the background chapter, simultaneously a complete 
turn-around of the political and the economic system.  
As imports had been heavily restricted through both national tariff policy and trade 
sanctions through the years of Apartheid, manufacturers had enjoyed high bargaining power 
and governed the value chain. The South African market was a product of supply and demand 
nationally, and retail was reduced to simple middlemen between consumers and 
manufacturers (Gibbon 2002). Manufacturers could demand a price, which retail then had to 
pass on to consumers as they were forced to source goods locally: 
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In the past they could only import about 5%, because up until 1990, we had import 
restrictions so you had to apply for an import permit. Up till 1990 we had much of a 
financially precarious position so we didn‟t have a lot of foreign exchange. So there was 
a whole clamp on imports, and to import anything you needed a permit. Good for the 
national industry because they came on shore. But it wasn‟t good, because it wouldn‟t 
make them productive. But the retailers had to buy locally because they couldn‟t import, 
or they could import maybe 5% (NCMA official 11.05.10). 
The strict import rules in South Africa explained above shows how manufacturers were 
relatively well protected from global competition and a low level of imports permitted to the 
domestic market. This left manufacturers with power to demand favourable conditions from 
retail, and production was a profitable operation. Thus, it did not prepare the manufacturers 
for global competition, and hampered productivity in the region. WTO membership from 
1995 restricted protection on free trade and the government responded with an aggressive 
liberalisation of the economy through GEAR from 1996. The belief was that strong economic 
growth would lay the basis for reduction of unemployment and a more equitable distribution 
of income and wealth (Weeks 1999). This has not been the case, and unemployment 
continued to rise.  
The labour-intensive industries did not get a period of step-by-step exposure to global 
competition, but experienced a total turn-around of the external framework without having the 
time or capacity to simultaneously change the internal structure. According to Barnes (2005), 
the tariffs on apparel dropped from 100% to 40% in a period of 10 years. This means that the 
clothing industry is still a protected industry, but because they were used to the dynamics in 
the closed economy, the industry did not manage to adapt quickly to the changes. The 
negative effects of rapid tariff reductions were further enhanced by the phase out of the MFA, 
gradually opening to free trade in clothing from 2005. The MFA had spread clothing 
production throughout the world, and competition was now stiff in attracting orders. While 
flexible sourcing patterns had become the norm in global clothing industry, even under the 
agreement, South Africa was used to a producer-driven value chain. Kaplinsky and Morris 
(1999) are questioning whether this, in combination with earlier import substituting policies, 
led to the fact that companies are not „hearing‟ the demands from changing markets. The 
industry had covered the whole field of domestic demand in the earlier period, and now they 
had the increase in imports as well as an alteration in the industry‟s power structure. Their 
research (Kaplinsky & Morris 1999) shows that manufacturers rank their own performance 
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levels as being relatively close to market requirements, while the buyers see a gap between 
customer demand and supplier performance. 
Progressively with the lifting of the MFA and the removal of quota on China, obviously 
the competition became stiffer in turning. There‟s a whole range of factors that caused it, 
but essentially clothing manufacturing in South Africa was becoming progressively more 
expensive, the economy here was opening up, obviously, after Apartheid, everything 
happened very, very quickly. The rand strengthen at the same time, so you‟ve got a strong 
currency, you‟ve got globalisation, you‟ve got the lifting of the MFA and you‟ve got 
basically high costs relatively speaking, not just labour but high costs generally, although 
labour is certainly too high. And that caused pressure on clothing manufacturing 
certainly from, well it was affected before that, maybe from 2002-2003, but certainly from 
2005 (Large manufacturer 20.06.10).  
The citation above describes how manufacturers were facing multiple changes over a short 
period of time. The manufacturer is here pointing out what he sees as the main challenges; 
increased competition through exposure to globalisation and the MFA phase out, a 
strengthening of the Rand caused by changes in national policy, and high production costs 
compared to their competitors. The industry was earlier structured by confidence-based 
business relationships where the manufacturers had the upper hand.  Now they increasingly 
have to form business relationship based on competition and adapt to the fact that retailers are 
not forced to source from local manufacturers (Weeks 1999). This could signify how the 
pursued neo-liberal policies in building down barriers to trade have resulted in a fierce 
competition amongst independent capitalists, in the form of companies, to secure further 
accumulation. 
5.1.2 Changing Production and Sourcing Patterns 
 
...the world became one big shopping basket with technology improvements and people 
are not afraid to get on a plane to China and see that they can shop from there. And it is 
far cheaper (CMT manufacturer 18.05.10). 
The informant cited above describes how suppliers in Durban experienced their customers 
changed sourcing strategies after trade was liberalised. The retailers determine the price on 
garment as they have the opportunity to import instead of using their local suppliers. Knowing 
that they have a broad sourcing option, while manufacturers depend on local orders, retailers 
push the local prices down with the constant threat of moving their order elsewhere.  South 
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African retailers have adapted the flexible sourcing patterns dominating global trade, while 
manufacturers are more locally restricted when relying on production sites and labour. This is 
felt on the manufacturing level, where the prices offered are not compared with local 
production costs, but where you can bring in the cheapest garments globally. Interviews with 
different companies in the industry reveal that the communication between retailers and 
manufacturers is close to non-existent, especially when it comes to smaller manufacturers. 
The lack of communication creates a bias in the industry as the costs and fees developed in 
the BC do not correspond to the prices that manufacturers receive (Bargaining Council 
official 15.05.10). Because manufacturers earlier held the bargaining power, manufacturers 
and retail never perceived themselves as mutually dependent on one another. Retail depended 
on manufacturers because tariffs prevented high import levels. The tables are now turned, and 
manufacturers depend on retail for orders. The skewed power relation is enhanced by the fact 
that manufacturers struggle in taking advantage of trade liberalisation on the export side, due 
to complex export premises (Barnes 2005). A manufacturer explains the challenge of retail 
power as follows:  
The biggest challenge is the retailers. Their sourcing strategies are dictating the survival 
... The increase in imports was directly related to the retailers importing strategies. I 
think they realised that once the apartheid era changed and people were allowed to 
import they started moving into that mode. I think about 10-12 years ago it came out a 
real benefit to that. The retailers realised that the clothing manufacturers have had a 
huge monopoly and that had changed (Large manufacturer 08.06.10).  
When tariffs were lifted from the industry, retail experienced that they could optimise profits 
by complementing their stock with imported goods, and pit production sites against each other 
to push the prices down. Retail is seen as the most powerful agent in the value chain for 
clothing as they can decide on what to market and sell in their retail stores. This decision 
power involves what ranges and brands to include, as well as volume, cost margins and 
duration of orders (Palmi 2007). 
Asian countries, such as China and India, have taken over extensive parts of the 
market share globally, and to some extent squeezed smaller producers out to the periphery of 
the global market. Nordås (2004) argued that the African countries benefiting from the MFA 
would be loosing market share after the phase out. While especially China built up a large 
productive capacity during the quota agreement (Nordås 2004), South Africa did not manage 
to build up an export base and flexible labour relations (Gibbon 2002). To illustrate the 
significance of China on the global market; US apparel imports from China increased by an 
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overall of 85% the first eight months of 2005, and in some categories by 250% of the levels in 
2004 (Abernathy et al. 2006). Exposure to economic globalisation, through neo-liberal 
policies, can explain the escalation of competition and rapid decrease in market share of local 
production, as highlighted by Taylor and Bryson (2010) when explaining similar changes in 
the heavy industry in the West Midlands, Britain. One important aspect for the Durban 
industry is how the increased use of imports from retailers and trading houses not only made 
the manufacturers having to compete for international markets, but also for a share in the 
domestic market. This was pointed out by Nordås (2004) as a possible outcome for smaller 
countries that had benefited from the MFA.   
Price is the toughest competition point globally. If a manufacturer cannot find an 
additional aspect to provide the customers, this can lead to a so-called race to the bottom 
between manufacturers. This race to the bottom implies a skewed power relation in the 
production and distribution system. When retail and large manufacturers can place their 
orders where they choose globally, their suppliers are turned into “powerless price-takers 
rather than partners and deal makers” (Appelbaum et al. 2005:2). Suppliers are then 
competing against each other by forcing prices (and wages) down, and destroying unionizing. 
In Durban, manufacturers are prevented from racing to the bottom through labour law 
negotiations in the BC and the way the council is prosecuting non-compliant manufacturers. 
In the past, the employer body did not demand the BC to maintain and follow-up on the wage 
rates as long as the social benefits were paid, but recently they have taken a new stance in 
terms of this issue. The current stand is that they want all manufacturers to be compliant, or 
shut down. For Durban, the non-compliant companies will involve about three quarters of the 
industry (Bargaining Council official 13.05.10). The issue is further discussed in the next 
chapter. 
5.1.3 Altered Power Relations in the Value Chain   
 
The aggressive sourcing from overseas by retail is forcing price competition on local 
manufacturers (Rogerson 2005). Nordås (2004) argues that the sourcing strategies of retailers 
in the industry have imposed a number of requirements on manufacturers, by pushing work 
and costs down the value chain and on to the production level. Manufacturers can absorb the 
costs by lowering margins, reduce the cost through increased productivity, or pass the costs 
further down the value chain. Hence, Durban‟s value chain of clothing can be said to fit the 
55 
 
description of Gereffi‟s (1999) buyer-driven value chain. The retailers dictate the terms in the 
value chain, and govern the operation of manufacturers with low bargaining power.  
Price is the least profitable competitive advantage, and where Durban manufacturers 
are not competitive globally. Since production is aimed mainly towards the lower market 
segments in Durban, they have few options to move upwards in the value chain and into 
operations that generate higher profit. The difficulty of finding another competitive advantage 
than price is further enhanced by the fact that the CMTs in the industry do not have any 
choice regarding what they want to produce. Most CMT manufacturers are not involved in the 
process of product development and distribution; hence their measures to keep costs down are 
limited. When given the design, the fabric, and the price from their customers, their action 
space is extremely limited: “All of the design operations are done by retailers nowadays. So 
the retailers go overseas and say; give me a price on this” (NCMA official 11.05.10). 
According to Kaplinsky and Morris (1999), value chain management has low priority for the 
final users in KwaZulu-Natal and retail do not see themselves mutually dependent on 
domestic suppliers. Nearly two-thirds of CMTs never visit their customers and when firms 
claim they are consulting with suppliers, they are basically inspecting whether suppliers have 
the capacity to produce the order rather than how the production is done. Companies report 
that instead of focusing on value chain development and helping suppliers to upgrade their 
operations to meet customer demands, they are dropped on short notice. This is confirmed by 
Gibbon‟s (2002) study of the clothing sector in South Africa where the relations were seen as 
arms‟ length, and the notion of partnership with suppliers were rejected. An informant from 
his study had the following to say about these changes:  
As recently as five years ago we tried to develop close relations with local suppliers. We 
even discussed common interests in relation to the DTI[Department of Trade and 
Industry]...But now we‟re looking for value. There‟s no more schmoozing. We‟re simply 
looking for value and relations have become arms‟ length... (Gibbon 2002:27).  
As pointed out by manufacturers in Durban, the pressure to keep prices down is immense. 
The price offered by a local manufacturer is compared firstly with the price of other 
manufacturers in the Durban area; secondly the price of production in non-metro areas; 
thirdly the price of outsourcing to or importing from neighbouring countries; and finally the 
price of imports from Asia. If the local manufacturers cannot „come into price‟, orders move 
elsewhere (CMT manufacturer 18.05.10). Since the manufacturers that are not paying the 
negotiated rates will be prosecuted by the BC, wages cannot fall freely as could have been the 
56 
 
outcome of heavy price pressure. Manufacturers find themselves squeezed between the global 
price competition caused by global sourcing strategies and the wage floor set by the 
Bargaining Council. This is pushing them out of competition and therefore out of the 
industry: 
The problem is that the playing field for garment manufacturers globally are not levelled. 
Although we get assistance to the extent ... it still doesn‟t compensate sufficiently for the 
unfair, let‟s call it uneven, playing fields that exists between here and again for example 
China. It‟s globalisation but you‟re not playing by the same set of rules  
(Large manufacturer 20.06.10).  
With flexible sourcing patterns, former manufacturers find that they can extract themselves 
completely from employing and use their customer base and other middlemen to continue 
operating and profiting in the industry. The increased importance of middlemen in the Durban 
industry reveals signs of a trader-driven value chain. This term has been requested in the 
value chain analysis because the dichotomy of producer- and buyer-driven chains does not 
reveal the whole picture (Scott 2006). In Durban, one can propose a combination of a buyer- 
and trader-driven value chain. Trading houses can connect retail with local production or 
import the garments ordered by retail. When importing, trading houses often do not engage 
with production at all. A trading house executive describes the dynamic when talking about 
his absent relationship with the production level: “I don‟t know who they are. We‟re dealing 
through trading houses in China as well. We don‟t have any actual factory that we deal with 
at all” (Interview 26.06.10). This can explain how broken down the value chain in clothing 
has become. Retail and trading houses have different middlemen and suppliers, and source 
from various locations depending on where they can profit the most. They do not need to 
know who they are dealing with in production, because they enjoy the value chain power and 
suppliers depend on them to uphold production. The production level has to adapt to decisions 
made at the buyer level. 
Neither in trader- or buyer-driven value chains do the sources to profit involve 
production and labour. This is in direct link with Kalantaridis et al.‟s (2008) perception that 
successful restructuring strategies are moving away from actual production and towards the 
retail end of the value chain, where you find the more viable ways of profiting. This leaves 
the remaining manufacturers in Durban struggling for the orders that end up on the local 
market, and they very well know the reason for orders being directed elsewhere:  
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South African manufacturers cannot offer any significant and tangible reason why they 
would be more expensive when their lead times are only two weeks difference ... with the 
best will in the world, I don‟t think retail has a choice when there is a 40 or 50 % price 
differential... (Producer of interlining for the clothing industry 09.06.10). 
The citation shows that Durban manufacturers have not managed to find a competitive 
advantage in clothing that attract orders locally. When price differs extensively to what retail 
and trading houses can receive through imports, they are basically cut out of the value chain.   
What is interesting in the South African context is that you find most of the global 
operations of „triangle manufacturing‟, a concept outlined by Gereffi (1994, 1996 in Hassler 
2003), inside the same country. He draws a typical example of the clothing industry‟s global 
dimension where clothing companies from first generation NICs fulfil the role as middlemen 
between buyers in advanced countries and producers in East and Southeast Asian developing 
countries. South Africa differs from the concept, when both buyers and middlemen are largely 
domestic and their distribution is mainly directed at the domestic market. Thus, the South 
African clothing industry does not reflect the global pattern of clothing production, as the 
domestic economy contains advanced, semi-peripheral and peripheral segments. South 
African retailers are sourcing both directly from producers and through other South African 
middlemen, and their products derive from both national low-cost areas, low-cost areas within 
the Southern African region or imported from Asian low-cost countries. This has led to an 
instability in the South African industry, making manufacturers uncertain as to when, or if, 
they will receive the next order. This in turn has made the South African manufacturers come 
to a point where their struggle to stay competitive and keep orders make trading houses and 
retailers uncertain of finding the predictability they need from local manufacturers: 
They have closed down and opened up here under a different name. Every time adjust the 
buy, shop and change. And their reliability is very bad; they don‟t always stick to what 
they say. You‟re dealing with constantly trying to find better factories here, and they are 
all struggling (Trading House executive 26.06.10). 
The dynamic culminates in a vicious and unstable circle where the manufacturers lose if they 
are depending on local orders and do not have additional restructuring strategies as those of 
retailers and trading houses.   
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5.1.4 Global competition 
 
You can‟t compete and pay the full rights of pay unless you‟re not a small niche operator, 
ties, chamber bands, things like that, in short runs, in which retail in fact can‟t get them 
overseas (NCMA official 11.05.10). 
Manufacturers find that when producing garments for the mass market, they are intensively 
challenged by the fact that these goods can be imported at lower prices from low-cost areas. If 
they cannot move into other market segments or upgrade their operations in the value chain, 
the enhanced competition will ultimately force them out of the industry. As outlined by 
Taylor and Bryson (2010), alterations in production patterns are making manufacturers try to 
shift away from mass-production and steer towards production of higher value, niche 
production strategies, to avoid having to compete on price. They compete by design in terms 
of expertise, specialisation and functionality, which can limit their exposure to competition 
from low-cost areas. This has not been, and cannot be, the case for smaller manufacturers 
depending on outsourced work in Durban (Gibbon 2002). The largest retail market in South 
Africa is for lower market segments, due to customer demand and purchase power, which 
means that these are the orders received from retail. As pointed out by Palmi (2007), even if 
companies were to change production and focus on the high-end of fashion, price will still 
determine the buying behaviour of many South Africans. Due to the high levels of poverty, a 
large part of the population is unable to afford high fashion garments.  
China is now heavily involved in the South African market, again exemplifying the 
dual dynamic of the Durban industry. One part of the value chain is struggling to keep both 
orders and employment in the producing part of the industry, while the other part has cut itself 
loose from national involvement except market share for sale. According to Jauch and Traub-
Merz (2006), local manufacturers are struggling to keep any market share at all, as a result of 
the outward orientation of the retailers. This has further increased pressure and competition 
for manufacturers in Durban:  
The amount of work that is going around these days from the retailers and buying houses 
to the local market, everyone is having to compete with that now. The retailers are 
outsourcing elsewhere, from overseas, from Lesotho or whatever the case might be. And 
the percentage of the production that is coming local is dropping and I think it‟s 
continuing to drop (Bargaining Council official 13.05.10).  
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When local orders are reduced, as described above, competition between manufacturers 
escalates. A study from 2003 suggests that retailers were already importing between 45-47% 
of their orders (Skinner & Valodia 2002). This continued to rise after the phase out of the 
MFA. Research done for NEDLAC (Barnes 2005) shows that imports in clothing grew in 
value from 703.206 R million in 1995 to 4571.93 R million in 2004. Even for the larger 
manufacturers, imports from Asia or neighbouring countries are emerging as a strategy to 
continue in the clothing industry, instead of using local manufacturers. These aspects have put 
an enormous downward pressure on price (Skinner & Valodia 2002). 
Because of the widespread capacities of clothing production in low-cost areas, 
manufacturers in Durban have the choice of competing on price or productivity, if not being 
able to advance from production to the more profit generating parts of the value chain. 
Unfortunately clothing always chases the low labour-cost areas and that‟s what happens. 
And labour is such a large percentage of your overall bearable costs  
(Large manufacturer 08.06.10).  
A large part of clothing production cannot be mechanised through technological upgrading, as 
could be a restructuring alternative for capital if the labour force is not „suitable‟ for capitalist 
production processes. Hence, the issue of labour and labour costs will determine profit, and 
production will „chase low-cost areas‟. As argued by Kalantaridis et al. (2008), successful 
restructuring strategies are moving away from production, and the Durban region is no 
exception:  
I think our marketing businesses have a good future; it just depends on where it is going 
to be made. We are set up in Lesotho and Ladysmith, but if we can‟t make it there we‟ll 
import it and just have the headquarters here (Large manufacturer 08.06.10). 
The informant explains how he perceives the future of the company. Since production from 
the Durban area cannot compete price-wise, they are lowering production costs in non-metro 
areas (Ladysmith) or neighbouring countries (Lesotho). The final option is to keep 
headquarters in Durban – sales, marketing, design – and import all garment. 
As the Durban region has focussed on mass-production for lower market segments, 
they are now in direct competition with other low-cost areas. But the playing fields are not 
levelled globally, as e.g. China has both lower wages and higher productivity (Jauch & Traub-
Merz 2006). While competition has heightened in lower income segments globally, imports in 
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these segments have increased in South Africa (Velia et al. 2006). This has intensified 
competition for orders on the Durban market. 
 
I think it is totally unfair for local manufacturers that we‟re now forced to compete with 
the Far East and the world... And why I say unfair is pretty straight forward, and more so 
for the CMTs because they pay labour. China is paying less than a third of what we‟re 
paying... All manufacturers are asking for in this country is: Please allow us or afford us 
the opportunity to compete on a fair and equitable basis with China. But no, in this 
country that‟s not allowed (CMT manufacturer 20.05.10). 
 
The CMT manufacturer above describes a frustration among many of the producing 
companies in Durban. They are well aware of what is available in other countries, and see 
their own high input-costs as hampering competitiveness.  
The Durban area has not managed to build up a sufficient export-capacity. Only some of the 
larger manufacturers are exporting, but they are also experiencing a decline as export orders 
are directed towards other low-cost areas in the Southern African region. A study on South 
African trade from 1998 showed that exports were moving away from labour-intensive 
industries with high use of unskilled labour, while imports were increasing in the same sectors 
(Nattrass 1998). This leads to manufacturers increasingly loosing market share and they are 
being squeezed out of the domestic market. For one of the largest clothing manufacturers in 
Southern Africa, the SEARDEL-group, exports dropped by 53,5% from 2003-2004, and only 
150 out of 2000 clothing manufacturers registered within the Sector Training Authority 
(SETA) have managed to export (Van der Westhuizen 2009). Both producers and retailers in 
the Durban area are still largely South African owned and production is aimed mainly at the 
domestic market (Gibbon 2002). This could signify that while being exposed to an increased 
international competition in domestic markets, the Durban manufacturers are holding on to 
the existing structures of selling, while the industrial environment for sourcing is changing. 
5.1.5 South Africa’s Regional Position 
 
South Africa, as the largest producer on the African continent, had to follow WTO demands 
on tariff-reduction that led them to a less favourable position in the region compared with 
their neighbouring countries. This has especially affected the export market. As mentioned, 
members within SADC began implementing a free trade area in 2000 (Kirk & Stern 2005). 
South Africa was, as the only country in the trade-agreement, defined as a first world 
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producer in the WTO round, meaning that goods from South Africa have to fulfil several 
requirements that are not imposed on their neighbouring countries (Barnes 2005). This can 
also have affected the restructuring the industry is going through, as trading from 
neighbouring countries means less requirements and therefore could have encouraged a 
relocation of industry to e.g. Lesotho and Swaziland. Voices from the industry argue there has 
been a misinterpretation of the actual state of the country, and a disregard of the segmented 
economy:  
Many years ago, South Africa was considered a first world producer. And when they 
were rated as such, the government was like; wow, we‟re a first world producer. That 
was nowhere near the truth at the time...In fact, this is very much a third world country, 
but because we were ranked that way, it affects how much tariffs can be charged on 
imported goods...And because as a third world country the feeling is that we should be 
getting a far better dispensation from the WTO to allow us to apply higher tariffs 
(Bargaining Council official 13.05.10).  
This is further confirmed by Theron et al. (2007) arguing that when the new government came 
to power in 1994, the country had already agreed on extensive tariff reductions based on 
South Africa as a „developed‟ rather than a „developing‟ country.  
A constraint on the clothing industry is the shortage of domestically produced fabrics, 
as well as the limited variety of fabrics produced locally. These factors inhibit the ability of 
companies to meet the requirements regarding rules of origin for exports under preferential 
trade agreements, and forces companies to import fabrics (Barnes 2005). The fact that the 
supply chain in South Africa is disrupted may have played a role in determining how South 
Africa can make use of both the AGOA-agreement and trade agreements within the WTO, 
and could partly explain the low export abilities of the country. As presented in the 
background chapter, the AGOA-agreement differentiate between developing and less 
developed countries, with the latter not having as strict rules of origin as the ones concerning 
South Africa. After Mauritius was redefined in 2004, South Africa is the only of the 19 
AGOA-beneficiary countries that does not qualify as less developed, leaving them with a 
competitive disadvantage in the Southern African region (Barnes 2005). South Africa has not 
been able to take advantage of the AGOA-agreement, which could also explain why 
companies are eager to set up factories outside of South Africa where they can benefit from 
the „less developed‟-status in export production. A manufacturer of interlining for the clothing 
industry highlights the issue regarding lack of textile-supply:  
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And a lot of retailer now have sort of adopted the strategy where, you know, x % of our 
merchandise for whatever department it is will be imported. And that‟s working for them, 
because we don‟t have mills, Africa is not vertical...generally Africa has the cotton, has 
the raw material, has the resource, but the supply chain is not here for the 
industry“(Interview 09.06.10).  
The informant points out an important aspect when highlighting the fact that the industry has 
difficulties in sourcing textiles and fabrics locally. With the disrupted supply chain in South 
Africa, retail and larger manufacturers have been forced to import textiles. This may have had 
the extended effect of facilitating an enhanced use of imports. If import relationships with 
companies in neighbouring countries and Asia were already well established, there is a short 
step from importing only inputs to start importing finished goods when struggling to produce 
locally. Because the rules of origin in AGOA tie the national textile industry to the clothing 
production process, any weakness in the textiles has a marked impact on the success of 
clothing exports (Barnes 2005). There is also an opinion in the industry that South Africa is 
not receiving the benefits they should in the WTO and that this in turn affects the balance 
between imports and exports (interview 13.05.10, 18.05.10).  
5.2 Internal Factors  
While the external factors affecting the clothing industry in Durban are, as we have seen, 
related to trade liberalisation and global, flexible sourcing patterns, it is important to explore 
the interplay of these with local factors. The internal factors in Durban will involve how the 
relevant institutions are responding to the changed industrial framework, the impact of labour 
regulations and illegal imports. 
5.2.1 The Institutional Framework 
 
It is expressed strongly in government documents that creating employment is highly 
prioritized in the formation of South African policy (Patel 2010). In 2006, the policy 
document „Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa‟ set a goal in halving 
unemployment and poverty by 2014 (Makino 2008). Still, many of the policies from the 
government continue to promote resource and capital-intensive activities, which is creating an 
anti-labour bias (Flatters & Stern 2008). The government has been accused of  neglecting the 
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industry‟s role in the South African economy (Gibbon 2002). Manufacturers express the same 
complaints: 
...any funding from the government was not passed on to CMT companies; they were only 
for the vertical companies. So there was no financial assistance. So as far as I‟m 
concerned, the government hardly recognises our industry although we employ more 
people than the vertical corporations do (CMT manufacturer 02.06.10).  
The smaller manufacturers experience that they are not seen as significant for job creation or 
industrial development. When CMT manufacturers are such a large percentage of the total 
industry in Durban, this is regarded as unfair, and contributing to their loss of faith in 
industrial policy. Flatters and Stern (2008) explain how recent policy proposals for the 
industry has done little or nothing to develop a more competitive and sustainable industry. 
The implemented policies are: 
...costly, they lack supporting evidence, they are biased towards particular producers, 
often those that are the least competitive, and without any recognition of fundamental 
differences and conflicts in the interests of different groups in the industry… 
 (Flatters & Stern 2008:55). 
Roberts (2000) shows that when comparing the trends in employment and production, it is 
clear that those sectors with large increases in production are not the same as those with an 
increase in net job creation. This could signify that where production has increased, 
employment is lost, either due to technological change, downsizing or an enhanced use of 
imports. 
The government has developed supporting schemes for the industry through cluster 
building and training programs (Palmi 2007). In that sense they are trying to support the 
industry and find a sustainable structure. This might have been the result if it was not for the 
fact that the majority of Durban manufacturers are not compliant, and hence cannot get the 
support offered through government initiatives. These non-compliant companies are often 
major employers, and the companies that need support to prevent further shedding of labour 
(Gibbon 2002). A government official in the EThekwini Municipality, the metropolitan 
municipality of Durban and its surroundings, further explains the issue:  
If you look on the DTI website you will see the ‟Clothing and Textile Competitiveness 
Program‟, the „Production Incentives Program‟ and one or two others. Basically they are 
trying to help the industry to drag itself up. One of the problems is that if you‟re not 
compliant you can‟t get the help...It is such a skewed relationship because the CMTs tend 
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to employ quite a huge number of people. We need to concentrate a lot more on them 
(EThekwini Municipality official 15.06.10). 
The information provided above shows that they are well aware of the situation and the gap 
created between those who need and those who can receive support. The larger, compliant 
companies are also increasingly the ones moving away from South African labour and 
enhancing their use of imports and outsourcing, as will be discussed in the next chapter. It is 
argued by smaller companies that the funding will not fulfil its original goal when received 
only by compliant companies in Durban: 
 
Only the big companies have access to these funds, and what do they do? They are not 
employing like we do or holding the employment base. They have actually gone across 
the border and they have a tiny employment base here. And what we are frightened of is 
that they will utilise the government funds on machinery etc. and it will go out across the 
border. It will not benefit any South Africans (CMT manufacturer 18.05.10). 
 
The informant expresses the frustration many smaller manufacturers feel about the way their 
struggles are met by the government. If the companies receiving support are using the funding 
for a restructuring strategy that will not benefit the industry or employment locally, the 
support schemes will lose their objective and become additional profit in the company pocket. 
This could also increase the already great conflict of interests between them and the smaller 
CMT manufacturers. How these conflicting interests affect negotiations in the BC will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Specific national policies can also partly explain the low export capacity. One of these 
would be the Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCS). The DCCSs were implemented to 
increase and encourage the outward orientation of companies by allowing them to claim a 
reduction on duty on their exports. The credits could also be sold to any other importer of 
clothing and textiles. The policy resulted in an unplanned outcome when the bulk of credits 
were sold to retailers who used the credits to import garments. The policy tool therefore 
reduced the demand for domestically produced garments and damaged domestically oriented 
clothing companies (Barnes 2005). The strengthening of the Rand in 2003 also contributed to 
the challenges with export performance in clothing. As highlighted by Culpeper (2005 in Van 
der Westhuizen 2006:15) “greater openness may be associated with greater volatility and 
economic shocks, for example, through capital surges or shifts in the terms of trade”. 
Especially when developing countries are pursuing policies of economic openness, as that of 
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South Africa, they become increasingly vulnerable to such volatility. The changes in the Rand 
value led to an exchange rate that favoured imports and hampered export production (Gibbon 
2002). 
In South Africa, lack of employment is a burning issue, and the government has stated 
that they are working towards decent work, reduction of inequality and defeating poverty. The 
government‟s rhetoric says that they are investing in employment for the future (Patel 2010), 
but in reality, in combination with the neo-liberal turn national policy took from the mid-90s, 
an intervention to prevent more jobs from being shed in the industry has yet to be seen. 
According to Theron et al. (2007), the government‟s emphasis on workers rights and growth 
through redistribution is difficult to bring together with its commitment to trade liberalisation. 
The union SACTWU is an affiliate of the largest union in South Africa, COSATU, 
which again is loosely allied to ANC. Agents in the industry argue that this has created 
difficulties in making their voices heard. The blurred lines between union and governmental 
politics in South Africa make the functioning of co-operation between state, capital and 
labour subject to debate. Many government officials were recruited from the unions after 
democratisation (Wood 2001). This is still the case as e.g. the Minister of Economic 
Development in president Zuma‟s cabinet from 2009, Ebrahim Patel, was the former General 
Secretary of SACTWU
8
.  
This is an industry in dire strait. People know what needs to be done I feel. It‟s out there. 
I think it is also a power thing. Because they are part of the alliance with the ANC it 
becomes also like a power play where they got the power to do this within their sector. 
Where they can bring the country to a standstill if they want to. And while they might get 
higher wages for their members, they are loosing tons of jobs in the urban areas where 
the CMT can‟t pay the rates because there is just not enough work  
(EThekwini Municipality official 15.06.10).  
The informant expresses that the alliance between the union and ANC might create further 
difficulties in planning a sustainable structure for the industry. She sees the union as strong, 
and with the capability of getting their voices heard in policy making. But at the same time 
the government has chosen to overlook suggestions both from the union and the industry 
when addressing industrial policy, which was most apparent in the formation of the GEAR 
policies (Pretorius 2000, Wood 2001), and the formation of labour legislations like the LRA 
(Makino 2008). It appears that since there is an alliance between unions and the government, 
                                                 
8 http://www.sactwu.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101:sactwu-welcomes-
swearing-in-of-ebrahim-patel&catid=54:2009&Itemid=76 
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union fails to take a clear stance on behalf of South African workers on the one hand, while 
government fails to intervene in Bargaining Council negotiations to assure the survival of the 
industry on the other. This has lead to policymaking without a clear strategy, where rhetoric 
fails to translate into action and they are watching the industry suffocate without interfering. 
Morris et al. (2001) confirm this by arguing that there is a gap between policy formulation 
and implementation. While efficiency and competitiveness of the sector is crucial for output 
and employment, they continue with tariff reductions in a more rapid pace than 
implementation of support programmes.   
Furthermore, smaller companies are left out when policies are put in place to support 
the industry in the BC. Because of the struggles regarding the restructuring of the industry, 
the BC has an alternative of granting companies an exemption from wage rates if they can 
provide information on their financial status and why they have the need for it. They will then 
be able to pay lower wages for a period of time, as to get their company back on track and 
avoid turning non-compliant (SACTWU official 17.06.10). There is a widespread 
understanding amongst the smaller manufacturers that these exemptions are not granted those 
needing it, but only larger manufacturers: 
What has happened [with industrial policy] is to protect the big manufacturers and I can 
use a classic example; there‟s a company called [company name]9 that has had an 
exemption from council for a good couple of years and that exemption doesn‟t apply to 
anyone else... (CMT manufacturer 02.06.10). 
The citation above concerns a general perception of the skewed relationship between small 
and large manufacturers in the Durban industry. Since many of the smaller are left out of both 
negotiations in BC and support from government, due to non-compliance, the larger 
manufacturers are more likely to get their voices heard and lobby their interests.  
...I would take the compliant order, give it to the shop steward on the union and say; take 
this, go to the union‟s council with all the staff. Take all 100 people, go to them and say; 
[company name] is closing down, what are you going to do with all of us?  
(CMT manufacturer 02.06.10). 
The manufacturer describes the extended effects of BC‟s prosecuting of non-compliant 
companies. He had just received a compliance order from the BC and was frustrated about the 
short-term solution on which they are embarking. There are limited employment opportunities 
                                                 
9 One of the largest clothing and textile companies in South Africa 
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for the labour force after their workplace has been shut down, and he calls for a long-term 
strategy from the union and the council to uphold local production. To close two-thirds of the 
companies down is not a solution to the challenge of unemployment in the country.  
Kaplinsky and Morris (1999) argue that as leadership of trade unions played a critical 
role under Apartheid and towards democracy, they are now left with few resources for non-
factory bargaining issues. They claim that the reason is that many of the great leaders were 
absorbed into government after the transition, leaving the trade unions with an inexperienced 
management. 
The union doesn‟t understand globalisation or doesn‟t want to understand how easy it is 
to move production around the world. And that‟s very difficult  
(Large manufacturer 06.06.10).   
Manufacturers also express that they lack confidence in the union. They argue that if 
SACTWU does not change its approach, the production part of the industry will disappear 
from the country, leaving all its workers unemployed or in unregulated business. Any strategy 
from the union to organise unregulated workers has yet to be seen. 
According to Kaplinsky and Morris (1999), liberalisation has forced great adjustments 
on various institutions (government and parastatal, business associations, private consultants 
and trade unions). The institutional structure needed a complete turn-around, but had little 
success in doing so. The authors see these struggles to adapt to new demands as a result of 
previous cultural and strategic orientation in combination with insufficiently trained personnel 
for handling industrial restructuring. Their research states the following:  
Although regional business associations mouth the need to move away from lobbying, 
they have little experience of playing an industrial restructuring and development role for 
their constituencies. In the clothing sector for example, 57% full manufacturers perceive 
the role of NCMA as being of purely lobbying nature, while 37% of CMT manufacturers 
do not believe that NCMA is representative of their interests 
(Kaplinsky & Morris 1999:731).  
As mentioned, NEDLAC was established after democratisation as a forum for 
negotiation between state, capital and labour (Pretorius 2000). Manufacturers claim that they 
have close to no arenas where they can affect national trade policy, so the functioning of the 
so-called corporatism can be questioned. An official from the NCMA in Durban had the 
following to say about their relationship with NEDLAC: 
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To influence national government they would have to go through NEDLAC, which is the 
largest business community. NEDLAC can negotiate issues, at least we have direct lines 
nowadays, which is actually quite good. We have had several plans the last 15 years, and 
none of it has come to anything… Now we can talk to the ministry. But we haven‟t had 
any affect on the national policy. They consult with us nowadays. They just introduced a 
huge new policy, and they showed it to us. We said; that‟s not going to work. And we 
redesigned it, gave them two different options to help the industry. They go; no, we don‟t 
like that, we go with the original one (NCMA official 11.05.10). 
What the citation describes is that NEDLAC is the only forum that they can address, but it 
stops there. The distance between being able to address the forum and actually affect policy is 
great. The smaller manufacturers do not even see NEDLAC as a forum to approach (CMT 
manufacturers 18.05.10, 02.06.10). 
5.2.2 Labour Regulations 
But you have got to start at some point, in becoming a global manufacturer, you‟ve got to 
look at the prices globally and the labour rates globally as opposed to being insular in 
South Africa. And that is where the unions have, unfortunately, reduced the jobs in this 
country. They have pushed the price way beyond. You know economics always win (CMT 
manufacturer 10.06.10). 
The manufacturer above argues that the wage rates in the industry are set with no relation  to 
the competitive level in clothing production globally. By agreeing on higher rates, the 
competitiveness of companies is deteriorating and more jobs are lost. This displays a great 
conflict between what national policies are pursuing, and what is possible to maintain 
production in a labour-intensive industry, again demonstrating the difficulties in trying to 
make trade liberalisation and labour protection compatible (Theron et al. 2007). As shown in 
the theoretical chapter, the expansion of neo-liberal policies in multilateral trade agreements, 
as well as nationally, has made labour costs subject to competition. Places and workers are pit 
against each other to attract investments (Lier 2007), and when retail and trading houses are 
not tied down locally to source their order Durban‟s high costs place manufacturers on the 
risk of being pushed out of the industry. Cheap imports from overseas are outcompeting 
Durban production in their domestic market. 
 
It is if the trade unions recognise that the industry is going to destroy itself. That it cannot 
sustain the wages that it‟s own people are paid, have to have a drastic movement 
downwards because in order to survive in the industry we have to be competitive.  To be 
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competitive in South Africa we have to be able to offer wages that give our good a price 
that is nearly the same price as imports (CMT manufacturer 18.05.10). 
The informant describes the incompatibility between competitiveness and the strict labour 
regulations in the industry. For the industry to survive, the wage rates must relate to the 
market and the price on imported goods. The balance is difficult, as you would need a wage 
floor to avoid that manufacturers start undercutting each other. A race to the bottom, as such, 
is directing the pressure downwards, leading to degrading conditions for the workers 
(Appelbaum et al. 2005). A problematic aspect in Durban is the fact that wages have 
increased annually with no correspondence in price increase. The retailers continue to push 
prices down because they compare it to what is available on the global market. The lack of 
correspondence between what retail demands and what production can offer while staying 
compliant, makes output increase while input stays the same or decreases. NCMA claims that 
in 2000 the production price demanded for a standard garment was R9.50, while the same 
garment was produced at R4.50 in 2009
10
. This means that the manufacturers are already 
experiencing a decrease in input, before having to deal with additional increases in labour 
costs. 
According to Lipietz (1997), the competition between NICs has globalised a single 
mode of production with continually lowering the wage rates. In Durban, one can argue that 
the industry is holding on to a Fordist wage relation of labour protection in combination with 
specialisation of tasks. In combination with the low skills in the industry, the industry will be 
outcompeted from above and below (Lipietz 1997).   
I‟ve said to them [the union]; that rate of pay, are you comparing it to Port Shepstone 
down the South Coast? What are you comparing it to? So we want one rate of pay in 
South Africa. I say that‟s a mistake. You need to look at China and say: Can we compete? 
(CMT manufacturer 02.06.10). 
As pointed out by the informant, wage rates can no longer be isolated nationally, but must be 
compared to what is available globally. In that sense, the labour regulations in Durban place 
wage rates above the level of competitively determined market wages (Kingdon & Knight 
2007). According to Cook et al. (2004), successful industrial regulations have to pre-access 
information about costs, income, capital investments, consumer demand and the costs of 
raising capital of the regulated firms. Furthermore, information about the market and 
                                                 
10 http://www.ifashion.co.za/index.php?option=com_myblog&show=Where-next-for-KwaZulu-Natals-
CTLF-Sector-.html&Itemid=75 
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macroeconomic events that might affect the regulated firms must be obtained. They also point 
out how this information tends to be incomplete in most regulative bodies. In Durban, one can 
observe that the regulations implemented do not correspond to the competitive environment 
or the income of companies in the industry. Additionally, they are not sensitive to the 
different cost structure of competing firms in the industry. As explained by a Bargaining 
Council official (13.05.10), there is no cooperation with the South African retail sector in 
developing sustainable labour regulations. How the labour regulations affect employment will 
be explored in the next chapter.  
5.2.3 Illegal Imports 
While trade was rapidly liberalised, additional challenges emerged. Trade liberalisation put 
large pressures on borders, and logically also the custom service. As trade in textiles and 
clothing enhanced, so did the illegal imports. Not only did the industry have to deal with an 
enormous increase of imports, but they also lacked a sufficient custom service to prevent an 
additional flow of illegal goods across the border. This is a clear symptom of the extended 
effects a rapid liberalisation may have on a country. An NCMA official describes the situation 
as follows:  
They can only inspect 5-10% of what‟s coming through, and they must take a chance with 
it. And they bribe them hugely for a container. Or they send it to Mozambique and then 
Botswana, which is a part of the custom union, and it just slips across the border. That is 
one of our biggest problems. If we could stop that we‟d come a long way. They don‟t have 
good enough manpower in the custom (interview 11.05.10).  
The illegal imports are coming in through dumping and under-invoicing and it is argued that 
because of the inability of the custom service to police clothing imports, the tariff rates that 
are set to protect the domestic industry is half the advertised level (Gibbon 2002, Barnes 
2005). A consultant of the textile and clothing industry describes the situation as leaning 
towards free authorisation when explaining how easy it is to bring goods across the border 
with false invoices in combination with high levels of corruption (interview 12.05.10).  
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5.3 Summary 
The chapter has analysed constraints to competitiveness in Durban, divided into external and 
internal factors. It is evident that the rapid shift from a protected industry with high tariffs to 
integration with global trade has market the productive domain. The industry has to compete 
with production in other low-cost areas which has led to immense pressure on price in 
Durban. Manufacturers are struggling to keep domestic market share, as retail and trading 
houses have increased their use of imports after trade liberalisation. Retail is holding the 
bargaining power in the value chain, comparing production prices locally with imported 
goods. The competitive pressure is further enhanced by South Africa having an unfavourable 
position regionally. Both in the WTO and AGOA, several requirements are placed on South 
African production that their neighbouring countries do not have to comply with, along with 
the lower production costs in the neighbouring countries.  
The internal constraints are the functioning of the institutional framework, labour 
regulations and illegal imports. In the institutional framework, governmental policies have 
implemented policies that have created an anti-labour bias in contrast to the stated priority of 
employment creation. Support schemes from both government and the BC are directed mainly 
at larger manufacturers, while the non-compliant companies are left out of any support 
policies. There is an overall lack of confidence in the industry‟s institutional framework. The 
manufacturers perceive the labour regulations as a major contributor to the deteriorating 
competitiveness in the industry as they make retail and trading houses use other sourcing 
channels than Durban. Additionally, illegal imports have put large pressure on the custom 
service, adding to the flow of cheap imports on the domestic market. 
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6 THE DURBAN RESPONSE 
What is the response to deteriorating competitiveness from manufacturers in the Durban 
industry? The chapter will answer the following research questions presented in the 
introduction: What strategies are manufacturers in Durban using to stay competitive? How do 
these strategies affect employment opportunities in the Durban labour market? The chapter is 
subdivided into three sections; „Responses at the Industry Level‟, „Responses at the Company 
Level‟ and „Labour Market Response‟.  
6.1 Responses at the Industry Level  
To close the industry down by having first of all competition from China which is 
squeezing down the prices on garment, and secondly having the union push the prices up 
on the wages ends up by just bottlenecking the industry into an area where there is just 
nowhere to go. You‟re caught between a rock and a hard place, and at the end of the day 
there is nothing that can really change it unless you go underground…  
(Trading house executive, 26.06.10).  
As the citation highlights, manufacturers in the Durban clothing industry find themselves in a 
squeeze. The trading house executive admits that smaller manufacturers have limited space 
for action in the current industrial frame. Trade in clothing opened up through both national 
interventions with neo-liberal policies after democratisation, and alterations internationally 
with the ending of the MFA. This left manufacturers in a struggle to keep up with the flexible 
work relations demanded in international trade. An increase of imports caused by new 
sourcing strategies is forcing price pressure on local rates. Lipietz (1997) argues that there is a 
limited compatibility between flexibility and negotiated employment. As this is the 
environment the Durban industry is operating in, signs of this contradiction are brought to the 
surface. National policies through GEAR liberalised and restructured the industrial 
environment, but simultaneously passed various legislations (see background chapter) that 
have increased the cost of employing labour and extended minimum wage floors (Naidoo 
2003).  
The industry in Durban is built up after a flexible pattern referring to how different 
companies are devoted to separate tasks in production and distribution. Trading houses are 
only sourcing; large companies are sourcing and producing, while CMTs are only taking 
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outsourced orders. All goods are at the final stance left with retail, dictating the prices and 
choosing the suppliers. This enhances the conflict in the industry when the flexible structure 
meets the labour regulations. Nattrass (2000) refers to a review of reforms in OECD 
countries, finding those countries that tightened their fiscal policies without also reforming 
their labour markets have experienced great losses in employment. As firms are dreading the 
consequences, such as high labour costs, they are instead shifting away from labour-intensive 
production.  
The Durban manufacturers are experiencing that profit is no longer to be found in their 
part of the value chain. The retailers and trading houses are growing immensely, while the 
number of registered factories and South African employment is shrinking weekly. This 
coincides with Kaplinsky‟s (2001) analysis of global competitive processes: As more 
countries have developed their capabilities in industrial activities, the barriers to entry have 
fallen and competitive pressure has increased. The process of competition leads to a search for 
new combinations to heighten profit and improve competitiveness, which in turn has led to 
the fact that primary economic rents in the value chain of clothing are increasingly to be 
found outside of production.  
 
When the imports started coming in we got less and less work. The main manufacturers 
had to compete against each other and buy cheaper. So they did. They went to China 
(CMT manufacturer 18.05.10). 
 
The citation outlines how CMT manufacturers find themselves „left behind‟ in Durban when 
the production patterns altered. First, retail changed their sourcing strategies. Then, large 
manufacturers found that they lost orders to Asia. As a restructuring strategy, the 
manufacturers followed retail‟s lead and started to import themselves. Both global and 
national buyers less and less choose Durban as a sourcing channel. The price on production is 
not competitive if compared with the price in other clothing producing countries. This has 
lead to massive downsizing and closures (Jauch & Traub-Merz 2006), especially among the 
smaller manufacturers.  
I think what made it worse, as I said earlier, [company name] when they moved out. You 
know they gave a lot of work out in the Durban area; they were one of the biggest 
outsourcing company. Now that was a big knock for our guys in Durban. They‟ve just 
taken out all the work putting it in neighbouring countries 
(CMT manufacturer 14.05.10). 
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The CMT manufacturer above explains the circle effects that emerge when large 
manufacturers are changing their company structure and sourcing strategies. Since the great 
amount of CMTs is depending on orders from larger companies, trading houses, and retail, 
the outcome is costly when orders are placed elsewhere. 
...but the volumes are getting less and less due to imports and cheaper pricing... When 
you can bring in a blouse made up cheaper than you can bring in the fabric, something is 
wrong (CMT manufacturer 10.06.10). 
The CMT manufacturer sees local orders shrinking, and that it can be cheaper to import a 
ready-made garment than for local manufacturers to buy the fabrics. Many of the informants 
are experiencing that earlier customers, such as Woolworths, Truworth, Foschini
11
, have 
started to import heavily. These are large retail chains with which the manufacturers have had 
long trade relations. Most of them say that their previous customers have set up production 
facilities in China for price reasons (CMT manufacturer 18.05.10, Clothing manufacturer 
08.06.10). 
6.1.1 Combining Weak Institutions with Local Competition 
 
Now who agreed to that [the wage rates] was the NCMA, the big guys. … Where are 
these big companies today? … They‟ve either closed or they are trading in neighbouring 
countries … They set the high standards, social benefits, provident fund, sick fund 
whatever but why did they move away from this country? Is it not because of 
affordability, the cheap labour that they got? So they couldn‟t afford it themselves. So 
how can they now throw that responsibility on to us? We are CMT; we get ripped off by 
the big guys...  (CMT manufacturer 14.05.10).  
The citation above describes an interesting dynamic of the negotiations in the Bargaining 
Council, which makes it possible for the industry to contribute to its own struggles. When 
opening up to free trade, clothing imports from other low-cost areas penetrated the South 
African market. This in turn has intensified local competition, as companies have to compete 
for the decreased amount of orders directed to local producers (Jauch & Traub-Merz 2006). 
After the mentioned decline in membership, the remaining members in the employer body are 
basically larger and more capital-intensive firms, which negotiate on behalf of all the 
employers in the region (NCMA official 11.05.10). The wage rate set in the Bargaining 
                                                 
11 South African retail companies 
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Council will apply to all clothing manufacturers that employ more than 5 people, even those 
without membership with an employer organisation (NBC 2010). When an employer body is 
only represented through larger companies, it is said to have adverse affect on employment in 
smaller, more labour intensive companies that do not take part in the negotiations (Nattrass 
1998). The skewed participation in the negotiations has obvious consequences in the Durban 
industry, which is mainly made up by smaller CMT manufacturers (Barnes 2005). Their 
voices are not heard in the negotiations, even though the reasons for their deteriorating 
competitiveness may differ extensively from those of larger firms. Hence, the outcome of 
Bargaining Council negotiations will reflect the interests of big business and not the industry 
in total.  
As mentioned, the current stand from NCMA is to prosecute all non-compliant 
manufacturers. When about three quarters of the Durban industry is non-compliant 
(Bargaining Council official 13.05.10), a large part of local competition will be cleared away. 
The reason why they are agreeing to increase the wages in the industry could then be a way of 
dealing with local competition. Nattrass (2000) argue that if a minimum rate is set above the 
level of what is manageable for smaller manufacturers, this can force them out of business. 
Even some of the larger clothing manufacturers see this dynamic as apparent: 
I said to them; guys, you are determined to silent competition. They are pushing for 
compliance right? They have a reason because they don‟t want to adapt to the needs of 
the time. They have got it in their minds that should they close all the CMTs, they would 
have the market to themselves (Large manufacturer 24.05.10). 
The informant believes that the employers in the negotiations are pushing for higher wages 
and compliance from all manufacturers to wipe out the CMT segment. The need for CMTs in 
Durban is no longer crucial, as manufacturers are setting up production units in other areas or 
use imports to balance their costs.  
Companies are frequently using relocation as a possible restructuring strategy to lower 
production costs (Gibbon 2002), which will be discussed below. The larger firms included in 
the NCMA, and thus with mandate in the Bargaining Council, are often the firms that have 
the capabilities to relocate production to low-cost areas. 
Today it is a very unfortunate situation that the employer body has agreed to start 
shutting down the non-compliant factories. But what is so terrible about it is that the 
manufacturers in the employer body are the mainline manufacturers that have relocated 
the manufacturing outside of the borders of SA. They have some manufacturing facilities 
here, don‟t get me wrong, but they have relocated the bulk. So they manufacture at a 28 
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USD a week rate outside of the country and they pay the rag-tag staff that is left here the 
100 USD. And you balance it. That is what is destroying the industry right now 
 (CMT manufacturer 18.05.10). 
What the CMT manufacturer explains is that the companies that are part of the employer body 
and have determined to prosecute non-compliant, are the same ones that are relocating. 
Companies can move their production out, but keep a small number of workers in Durban. 
Hence, they keep their seat in the Bargaining Council. They are setting the wage rates for the 
rest of the companies in the region, but balance their own costs by having the majority of their 
production done in low-cost areas (either non-metro areas or neighbouring countries), or 
import what they cannot produce in-house. They can also take local orders and outsource 
what they are unable to produce themselves to other Durban companies. That way they can 
offer the suppliers a price that forces them to be non-compliant, but they themselves stay 
compliant as the production is not done within their own production facilities. It is stated in 
the National Main Collective Agreement (NBC 2010) that outsourcing to non-compliant 
companies is not permitted and that the outsourcing company have to make sure that their 
suppliers are holding a valid certificate of compliance from the Bargaining Council. Still, 
information from different companies in the industry shows that this has yet to come into 
practice. A trading house executive had the following to say when asked if they made sure of 
compliance in the companies they were outsourcing to: “No, it‟s basically up to them. We 
don‟t get involved with them, there is no law of what I know that stipulates that we check” 
(Interview 26.06.10). This again exemplifies the gap between theory and practise in industrial 
policy. At the same time, this approach would only lead to more companies being forced to 
shut down and therefore not bring about a final solution. 
By pushing for a wage increase, larger manufacturers squeeze out local competition 
for orders, as smaller manufacturers are unable to cope with the regulations and at the same 
time do not have the cost structure to relocate. This way, not even the orders directed towards 
the local market will benefit Durban employment. This can relate to struggles between 
independent capitalists when accumulation processes are hampered. As outlined by Marx (in 
Harvey 1982), independent capitalists will try to minimize their own loss by pushing it on to 
others.  
They are the very big guys that first set high standards for minimum wage and all sorts of 
social benefits. They reached a point where they said it was too expensive, they had a lot 
of fights with the union, and they decided to go and open these plants in foreign areas in 
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neighbouring countries. So they reached a point where affordability became critical, so 
how on earth are we going to afford it? (CMT manufacturer 14.05.10). 
The citation describes how the large manufacturers first agreed upon the negotiated 
regulations in the BC, until they started feeling the competitive pressure and no longer could 
continue profiting under the regulations. Instead of adjusting the local regulations to the 
changed framework of trade, they withdrew production from Durban. In a feature on the crisis 
in the clothing industry, CMTs argue that the larger manufacturers have priced themselves out 
of the market by agreeing to unrealistic wages, and are then trying to survive by squeezing out 
local competition (Terblanche 2010). Neither the Bargaining Council, the union or national 
government follow up on this dynamic. The latter claims that the only way they can be 
assured that decent living wages are paid in the industry is through demands of compliance, 
even though they are aware of what is going on. A Bargaining Council official had the 
following to say about the negotiations: 
We as the Bargaining Council, and I‟ll say this openly, are strangling employers. 
Companies can‟t afford to pay what they are entitled to pay of social benefits and wages. 
And we task with prosecuting them, we carry out mandates, and it certainly is a huge 
contributor to the decrease (Bargaining Council official, 13.05.10). 
The Bargaining Council is prosecuting companies that are not compliant by delivering 
compliance orders and, in the last instance, forcing the companies to shut down. The rates set 
are a result of negotiations between the employer body and the union. One of my informants, 
a relatively big CMT manufacturer, had recently received a compliance order and shared 
some conflicting information about the process: 
The union is so upset that we got compliance orders yesterday. They are creating such a 
fuzz. They want to fight the council on [company name]‟s behalf. I just said I‟m not 
getting involved, you guys can do what you want to do...They don‟t understand it. When 
the guy from the council came to present the compliant order yesterday he said; I can‟t 
believe this company is getting this. He said; your wage rate is double of what a lot of the 
other companies are paying. But that‟s the way it works 
(CMT-manufacturer 02.06.10).  
The union wants to fight the compliance order on behalf of a company that is not paying the 
official rates. These rates are a result of negotiations between that same union and the 
employer body. This implies that not even the union believes that the industry can operate 
within the current labour regulations. So if the union is opposing to the rules, who are then 
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determining the wage increase? SACTWU is said to be one of the unions with the highest 
industry penetration in the country (Wood 2001), which makes it difficult to believe that the 
employer body is dictating the terms in the BC. Still, a report presented at the TexCon 
TwentyTen in September 2010 states that some of the largest importers in the industry are 
also ranked as manufacturers. The report expresses worries that when such stakeholders lobby 
for their interests, it may skew the outcome in favour of the import roles that have been 
assumed rather than the manufacturing one (Matlotski 2010). This could be the case of the 
dynamics in Bargaining Council negotiations.  
6.2 Responses at the Company Level 
Naidoo (2003) identifies a general trend in South Africa where the market has found a way to 
reassert its power over workers by avoiding direct employment. There has been a greater use 
of so-called atypical employment, including independent contractors and labour brokers. An 
interview with the NCMA expresses the same impression: 
But there is a large use of contract labour nowadays. That is a similar thing to labour 
brokers, but the manufacturers do it themselves. They employ contract labour. Same 
conditions of service, but the labour will be under 3, 6 or 9 month. And our production is 
cyclic; we are at a low point at the moment, from June till October it starts taking on for 
the upturn. So there is some staff for the low level, and they take in on contract for high 
season. Some of the production gets almost twice as big... That‟s the only way to remain 
flexible in the industry (NCMA representative 11.05.10). 
Clothing production has always been cyclic because of the seasonal divide, but it is the 
increase in use of contract labour that is significant. Due to the decline in local orders, 
manufacturers cannot afford to keep a large labour force on full-time contracts. This is a part 
of the new restructuring strategies, where the group of core workers is kept to a minimum to 
be able to uphold production.  
 … You‟re not fussy on what you do, if somebody gives you a pair of trousers, you‟d make 
trousers. You take what you get and you are told the prices and by the end of the day you 
are forced to pay (CMT manufacturer 20.05.10). 
The manufacturer above points out how little influence the smaller manufacturers have in the 
value chain when locked at the production level. Several informants pointed out that they 
have to take all the offered orders, or lose their customers. There is not sufficient action space 
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for manufacturers to place any demands on retail. As local competition is stiff because of the 
high level of import penetration, manufacturers usually have to take anything that comes their 
way.   
There are signs of the so-called race to the bottom in Durban as manufacturers that 
have not relocated or shut down are fighting over the remaining orders by going underground 
to circumvent labour regulations from the BC to cut costs. They are undercutting each other 
and try to make the most profit out of the orders they receive. A well-known term in the 
industry is „cabbages‟. These are extra pieces of clothing that the CMT manufacturers have 
squeezed out of the textiles they receive with the orders, and sold at multiple factory outlets 
throughout the city as a way of trying to make some additional profit (Bargaining Council 
official 15.05.10). This is one of the few strategies CMT manufacturers have to circumvent 
retail‟s power over the market for clothing in general, if not targeting labour costs. 
One can divide the specific restructuring strategies at the company level into four 
groups: Alteration of the company format, relocation, unregulated business, and closure. The 
categories are not fixed, and may overlap in some cases. What is interesting about these four 
groups is that the outcome is very similar – jobs in regulated business are disappearing in 
Durban. Manufacturers are aiming to avoid local labour regulation or abandon the 
responsibility of labour. 
6.2.1 Altering the Company Format 
Several manufacturers have chosen to change the format of their company as a way to adapt 
to the constraints to competitiveness in the industry. Two distinct strategies are to be 
presented in this section; trading houses and co-operatives. 
As a consequence of the increased competition and strict labour laws, a restructuring 
strategy of former manufacturers has been to reorganise their company into trading houses. 
This means that they have taken out the production part of the factory, and are working as 
middlemen between production and retail. Because they are previous manufacturers, they 
have built up business connections with both retail and suppliers. Hence they can keep their 
customer base and suppliers while moving towards the retail end of the value chain. This 
leaves them with a broader spectrum of sourcing options, as they are not tied down locally by 
production facilities. They only produce samples to be used in presentation to retailers. 
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Every company that has downsized and becoming a trading house and they operate 
through the CMTs are very successful today. There are a lot of companies that were 
formal before and have become trading houses. There are a whole lot of them in South 
Africa. What they do is that they out the client base. They would go to Truworth or 
Foschini and talk with the buyer or tour with the buyer to Europe or Far East, find out 
what the buyer is interested in and they produce a sample 
(Large manufacturer 24.05.10). 
As orders are scarce and the local competition is stiff in Durban, it is easy to find factories to 
do the work. This means that trading houses can move into areas of design and marketing 
instead of production, which are seen as the more profiting areas in the clothing industry. This 
is in direct link with the findings of Klein (2002), where the value of the production process 
has been reduced substantially. Surplus value in clothing has shifted towards branding and 
marketing. As stated by Phil Knight (in Klein 2002:197, own translation); “there is no value 
in making things anymore. The value is added through thorough research, through innovation 
and through marketing”. Production is reduced to tedious routine work of marginal 
importance. When companies are avoiding production, they free themselves from the struggle 
between labour and capital, wages and profits. This struggle is left with the supplying 
companies down the value chain. They can also choose to import parts or all of the 
production, as the following citation describes: 
…about 15 years ago where we had anything up until about 25 factories doing local 
CMT, and things were working very well… we do a 100% import at the moment, 
everything comes out of China (Trading house executive 26.06.10). 
The citation above shows the extent of redirected orders. This trading house was not a newly 
converted one, but gone through massive changes in sourcing strategies as the industry started 
feeling the competitive pressure. If production in Durban is not predictable or cheap enough, 
trading houses will choose to import. There are also examples of the trading houses taking 
advantage of the local competition, and use their wide sourcing option to pressure 
manufacturers to produce cheaper. Because of the option of using e.g. Asian suppliers, many 
CMTs go a long way to land the orders. A CMT manufacturer explains how pressure from 
trading houses and retail is pressuring factories to non-compliance, basically because labour is 
the only cost where it is possible to cut for the CMTs:  
Some of these factories or design centres (same as trading houses) have grown to where 
they have no labour... They will give you the work, they will give you the price that forces 
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you to be non-compliant. Your workforce will be paid non-compliant wages because you 
are trying to get the wheels to turn (CMT manufacturer 18.05.10). 
Hence, price competition puts a large pressure on Durban manufacturers to produce cheaper, 
and can push them out of the industry at the last stance. 
A strategy that upholds employment, but which bypass the labour laws is the strategy 
of turning the factory into a co-operative (Gibbon 2002). After legislation from the 
government, as a way of trying to create employment, a clothing factory will fall outside of 
the labour laws set in the Bargaining Council if the company is owned and operated by the 
workers. The initiative is meant to encourage groups of workers to come together and create 
their own livelihood (DTI 2011). This should inspire entrepreneurship amongst workers and it 
is argued that they should therefore not be restrained by having to follow the labour 
regulations. One of the main arguments is that profit is to be distributed according to skills 
and experience within the co-operative, and it is therefore irrelevant to force co-operatives to 
follow the negotiated rates. What the Bargaining Council sees happening in Durban is that 
employers take advantage of this opportunity as a way out of the struggles and turn their 
factory into a co-operative on paper, without changing the company structure in regard of 
ownership or distribution of profit: 
They‟re setting up these co-ops and register them and essentially nothing changes in the 
factory. They‟re still run by a director, an owner, and the workers are made to sign 
something they don‟t really know what they are signing and they become a co-operative. 
And because of that they fall out of our jurisdiction, and they can basically do whatever 
they want; there‟s no protection for employees, there‟s no benefits provided, and really 
it‟s just a facade and the company keeps running as it always has... And when they do, 
they pay lower wages, they can take work at lower prices and it continually leads to 
almost down spiral (Bargaining Council Official 13.05.10). 
This has been facilitated by the employer union the Confederation of Employers South 
Africa‟s (COFESA) assistance in restructuring workforces into co-operatives and 
„independent contractors‟. The workforce is then redefined and will no longer count as 
employees. An employee is, stated in the Labour Relation Act, “any person, excluding an 
independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or 
entitled to receive, any remuneration” (Skinner & Valodia 2002:64). The work of COFESA 
in encouraging the formation of co-operatives can be seen as an institutionalisation of a 
circumvention of labour regulations. None of the provisions of the Labour Relation Act or 
83 
 
other labour legislation will then apply. One of the informants explains the approach of 
COFESA as follows:  
We joined COFESA when we opened and said; look, we don‟t have a problem with the 
BC, but we cannot match the minimum rate, we cannot afford social benefits. COFESA 
said; you don‟t have to, there are loopholes in the system, come join us 
 (CMT manufacturer 14.05.10). 
One of my informants had to downsize his company when struggling to stay compliant with 
the Bargaining Council, but told his workers that a possibility was to establish a co-operative 
that he would supply with work. They hired factory space and machines from him, and he 
stayed registered with 5 workers. Hence, he did not have to follow the labour regulations, but 
could keep his customer base due to the supplying arrangement with the co-operative next 
door (CMT-producer 20.05.10). An informant from a trading house also explained how they 
used to have a ship-off and delivery section incorporated in the company, but they turned it 
into a co-operative for cost reductions: “So they charge us and we pay them, but essentially I 
set them up and now they have gone on their own” (Trading house executive 26.06.10). Such 
further fragmenting of the value chain in clothing, as the two strategies are examples of, 
makes it possible for the agents at higher levels to avoid regulations and the responsibility of 
labour. For more information on the legislation and formation of co-operatives in Durban, see 
Roman (2011). Her master thesis on the formation of co-operatives in Durban, based on 
fieldwork in Durban from May-July 2010, analyses the interplay of theory and practice in the 
formation of co-operatives.  
6.2.2 Relocation 
Just a small amount of production is left in Durban. Less than 10%. We used to employ 
12 000 people in Durban, now we employ 4 200 [including administrative staff]. We have 
grown tremendously, but by manufacturing in low-cost areas (Large manufacturer 
08.06.10). 
The citation above exemplifies an alarming trend in Durban, where companies are 
increasingly relocating their production out of the area. This could either be to non-metro 
areas, where wages are significantly lower, or to neighbouring countries - mainly Lesotho or 
Swaziland. Because of the differentiation of wage rates in metro- and non-metro areas, as 
explained in the background chapter, companies see an opportunity to use the lower rates to 
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enhance profit. If the non-metro areas are not suitable, companies move their production out 
of South Africa. Both Lesotho and Swaziland already have an established clothing industry 
and a large labour pool. Even when including the obvious transportation costs, companies fin 
that they can decrease their overall production costs through relocation.  
A range of companies is also performing a combination of relocation and outsourcing, 
mainly to avoid the responsibility of employing. This would mean that they are supplying 
their own production with outsourced production, either locally or from neighbouring 
countries. Additionally, large manufacturers have started to import from Asia themselves 
(Gibbon 2002). Skinner and Valodia (2002) argue that when companies relocate, they often 
keep certain operations in Durban; especially the ones requiring skilled workers and where 
quality is more decisive than price. For the orders that have to be produced at low prices, 
manufacturing in neighbouring countries is viewed as a better option. Interviews with large 
manufacturers confirm the trend of moving away from employing and reducing local orders:  
...[The company] essentially did three things; reduced it‟s own manufacturing in South 
Africa to the extent, sourced garments directly through imports to complement it‟s ranges 
and … opened a manufacturing capability in Lesotho 
(Large manufacturer 20.06.10). 
As a result, they are leaving other companies with the employment responsibility, or rejecting 
the use of Durban labour in production. The relocation process is likely to continue because of 
the negative circle-effects on supplying companies in Durban. As the pressure from global 
competition forces some to move out, this enhances local competition between larger 
manufacturers and trading houses to get the garments produced at the lowest possible price. If 
your competitors are relocating, and benefiting from it, other companies follow their lead to 
maximise profit. Fewer and fewer companies are managing to cope within the existing 
regulations while simultaneously staying competitive globally. 
I would relocate all my factories to Obsila
12. You see, we‟re in negotiations at the 
moment. In negotiations what we have tabled is that we want a 30% differentiation 
between metro- and non-metro areas in the long term. If we get that I will move 
everybody to Obsila.  If we do not get that, I have already started to get my CMTs 
relocating to Swaziland or Lesotho. So we are prepared for the challenge (Large 
manufacturer 24.05.10). 
                                                 
12 Located in the non-metro area. 
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The clothing manufacturer above has his own design centre, several retail stores and is 
outsourcing production to 75-120 different CMTs (interview 24.05.10). They are following 
the path of other clothing manufacturers before them; first trying out the non-metro areas, 
before relocating or outsourcing to neighbouring countries. If the company moves out, many 
orders will be lost for the local CMTs. The informant states that he will get his CMTs to 
relocate, but this is seldom an option for small companies with low profit margins.  
6.2.3 The Sector of Unregulated Business  
Devey et al. (2003) state that there is no clear line between regulated and unregulated 
business, and the Durban industry is no exception. Apart from some illegal activities, there 
are few examples of unregulated activities operating without links to regulated activities. In 
Durban there are regulated, semi-regulated and unregulated clothing companies, with the 
latter being the ones not registered by the BC. Semi-regulated companies are registered, but 
they do not follow some or all the labour regulations. Theron et al. (2007) argue that a large 
part of the clothing industry has been pushed over to the unregulated sector because of no 
other viable way to restructure and still stay in the industry. They find that there has been a 
displacement of jobs from the regulated to the unregulated part of the sector, where they can 
lower the labour costs in an attempt to stay competitive. As we have seen, many of the larger 
manufacturers in the industry are making regulation avoidance close to the only option for 
smaller manufacturers to continue production. The price pressure from retail and trading 
houses is immense, and to avoid regulation is regarded as a way to make ends meet. This does 
not imply that the regulated companies do not outsource to unregulated companies, as the 
links are normally tight between the two sectors. 
The mentioned unregulated companies are continuing to operate as usual, but have 
gone underground to avoid having to follow the negotiated labour regulations from the BC. 
According to the NCMA (in Skinner & Valodia 2002), the number of registered firms went 
down from 450 in 1990 to 65 in 2001. They estimate that around 300 employers with about 
20 000 employees are not complying with some or all of the collective agreements.  
Home-based working is one of the formats that avoid regulation. Skinner and Valodia 
(2002) argue that this form of manufacturing is emerging in both the neighbourhoods of many 
formerly registered workers, such as Chatsworth, as well as the inner city of Durban. This is 
confirmed in interviews with manufacturers:  
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And with the BC forcing so many people to become compliant and the huge 
retrenchments in the industry two other industries have sprung up. One is the garage 
industry where people work 4 or 5 in a garage or at home, near their homes, probably 
earning 200-250 rand a week. They would manufacture small orders of the price  
(CMT manufacturer 10.06.10). 
 
The informant acknowledges that the home-based industry has been around for many years, 
but highlights that the size of it has increased considerably. Because of the small amount of 
workers, they will fall outside of BC regulations (NBC 2010). A reduction of the company 
size will thus serve as a way to circumvent the regulative framework. As he points out; the 
wage rate is around one third of what is demanded in the formal industry. He also mentions a 
second new industry, which is in direct link to the increase of imports: 
The second industry that has sprung up, and is now big, is the 'inspect, repair and 
dispatch of imports'. Those companies are not registered with the BC and the machinist 
work for them, in some instances would be up to 20 machinists. They work for around 
350 rand a week, they work nights, they work whenever, because if a container comes in 
today and has delivery on Friday they will work 24 hours a day inspecting, repairing, 
tagging, pressing and dispatching. It is legal, but not in the garment industry. It falls 
under another sector, I don‟t know where, but it is not a sector that SACTWU is involved 
in. The BC doesn‟t seem to know too much about it and what they know they‟re incorrect 
(CMT manufacturer and cooperative 10.06.10). 
What the informant describes in the citation above is a new part of the clothing industry that 
has emerged from the fact that imported goods are increasingly penetrating the domestic 
market. He claims that former manufacturers of different size have transformed into this type 
of company, relying only on imports. Since they are not producing, they fall outside of labour 
regulations in the clothing industry and, based on information from the interviews, they fall 
outside of regulations in total (CMT manufacturer 10.06.10, Bargaining Council official 
13.05.10).  
6.2.4 The Final Option 
The council is giving us a very hard time. At the moment there are 345 compliance orders 
out to companies to close them down (CMT manufacturer 02.06.10). 
The last, but frequent, option is to shut down production. The citation above describes how 
the BC is functioning to force companies to compliance. If compliance is not reached, the 
companies will be shut down. The industry in Durban is shrinking weekly, as the 
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manufacturers do not manage to cope with the competitive pressure in combination with 
labour regulations. Skinner and Valodia (2002) presents numbers where 22 756 jobs were lost 
in the clothing industry in South Africa in a two year period from first of July 1999. The loss 
was highest in KwaZulu-Natal, and Durban had the highest number of company closures in 
the region. The actual number of lost jobs and closed factories is difficult to obtain, because it 
is argued that many of the factories have re-opened as companies unregistered by the BC (see 
Morris et al. 2001, Theron et al. 2007, Skinner & Valodia 2002). 
6.3 Labour Market Response 
6.3.1 Labour Market Disequilibrium  
 
Maybe in 50 years time we‟ll have decent jobs, but right now we need jobs. To put food 
on the table you don‟t need a job that pays you 50 000 R a year, you need a job that pays 
you. And as often as possible. The union is basically taking the food out of a lot of 
people‟s mouths by their stance. Their absolute non-negotiable stance  
(EThekwini Municipality official 15.06.10). 
The informant expresses concern about the government‟s focus on decent work when the 
challenges in providing employment opportunities at all are so severe. If the criteria are set 
too high regarding what kind of work is allowed to offer, this may result in an increase in 
unemployment instead of improving existing working conditions. Endresen and Bergene 
(2006) support these findings, arguing that governments and unions are facing a dilemma 
when trying to improve labour standards. They see that to prevent job losses in certain 
industries, governments may have to accept a weakening of labour standards.  
The decent work approach was expressed by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in 1999 as follows:  
The primary goal of the ILO today is to promote opportunities for women and men to 
obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equality, security and 
human rights ( Ghai 2006:1). 
The concept of decent work includes: rights at work, employment, social security and 
industrial relations. This implies that decent work is not just a question about the quantity of 
jobs, but also the quality (Ghai 2006). The difficulty with ILO‟s decent work approach is 
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when competition makes the combination of the two aspects close to impossible. According 
to Fields (2003), various studies on labour demand elasticises have established that it exists a 
trade-off between wages and employment, making the demand for an increase in quality and 
quantity of jobs a difficult requirement.  
Increased imports from low-cost areas have decreased the demand for low-skilled 
labour in many manufacturing countries. This is very much the case in Durban, and 
manufacturers find themselves captured between the price pressures from retailers on the one 
hand and wage pressure from the Bargaining Council on the other. It is difficult to increase 
productivity when profits are low and assistance close to non-existent. The result will often be 
to downsize or cut employment. Even though profiting on the way they are now operating, 
companies that have distanced themselves from direct employment are well aware of the 
social consequences:  
It doesn‟t give you a good feeling. It‟s wrong, it‟s not the way it should be going, and we 
should be supporting our own people here. And I have tried, but it doesn‟t work (Trading 
house executive 26.06.10).  
The informant expresses concerns about the direction the industry is heading, and the 
destructive effects on the Durban labour market. The tendency of moving away from 
employing South African labour is devastating for the large amount of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers in the country. From 1995 to 2003, the unemployment rate rose from 17 to 
28% on a narrow definition and from 29 to 42% on a broad definition, leaving South Africa 
with one of the highest unemployment rates in the world (Kingdon & Knight 2007). Marais 
(2011) explains how the narrow or official definition does not include those who had not 
taken „active steps‟ in finding work during the four weeks prior to the survey, leaving the 
definition misleading regarding the gravity of the unemployment situation in the country. The 
fact that 82,2% (Barnes 2005) of jobs in the clothing industry are semi- and low-skilled means 
that the sector could be an important creator of employment with its labour absorptive 
capacity and its ability to offer entry-level jobs. But, to employ is now seen as the most 
challenging part in manufacturing, as you are more or less bound to get in conflict with the 
Bargaining Council. As explained by a CMT manufacturer: “If we weren‟t so worried about 
labour legislation we would have more employees … We are actually afraid to employ more 
people” (CMT-manufacturer 18.05.10). The wage-employment elasticity outlined in the 
theoretical chapter indicates a difficult trade-off between labour protection and employment. 
This is confirmed in studies by Kingdon and Knight (2007). They argue, as mentioned, that 
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the regulated sector in Durban pays well above the level of competitively determined market 
wages and that this in turn has had harmful effects on employment. The trend has been 
noticeable in over a decade, with wage levels continuing to rise for those with regulated jobs, 
while unemployment grows. Ginsberg (1998) argues that the rising labour costs represent a 
constraint on labour-intensive investment, in combination with the hazardous procedure of 
laying workers off because of the entrenched worker rights. He finds the increase of capital 
intensity in South African companies, as opposed to labour intensity, being a direct result of 
the strictly regulated labour market. The regulations lay heavy constraints on small business, 
as their economies do not have the magnitude to afford the wage increases agreed on by large 
employers and unions. 
It is to get the trade unions to recognize the limitations to what the market dictates. And 
the market dictates that the wage should be 400R a week and not 691R a week. And you 
are forced to pay 691R a week when the answer is very simple. You get levies on top of 
that and are up to 800R and what do you do? You say I can‟t survive in this environment 
and you put up a factory in Lesotho (CMT manufacturer 18.05.10). 
The manufacturer argues that the negotiated rates are too high to make the Durban industry 
competitive. When competing with cheap imports, the regulations are pushing production out 
of South Africa. Leaving wage rates to market forces can be the start of a brutal race to the 
bottom at the expense of workers. Furthermore, the global „race to the bottom‟ has turned 
unionising into a lose-lose situation. Unionised workers are likely to lose their jobs, as 
companies will place their orders with the cheapest factories, and if the workers do not 
unionise, their rights will continue to be violated (Appelbaum et al. 2005). In Durban, the 
restructuring and shedding of labour has released a large group of workers to unemployment 
or unregulated employment, with limited employment options outside the industry. This 
means that these workers will be more willing to accept lower wages and less favourable 
conditions to keep a job in the industry. This can relate to Marx‟ (in Harvey 1982) analysis of 
the conflict between labour and capital where capital withdraws from employment in an 
attempt to regain control over labour to continue the accumulation process.  
In Durban there has been an annual increase of wage rates in the regulated sector 
through the negotiations in the Bargaining Council (Naidoo 2003). By raising the labour, 
firms will struggle even more to cope with a rapidly changing global environment of trade in 
clothing. As pointed out by Nordås (2004), competitiveness at the manufacturing level can be 
measured through productivity or costs. Higher productivity is difficult to obtain in Durban, 
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as assistance is not received and productivity payment (i.e. piece rates) is not allowed (Gibbon 
2002). When not being able to match the cost level of global production, a lower rate of job 
creation is the logical outcome of deteriorating competitiveness in Durban. When labour 
demand is reduced, vulnerable groups in the labour market are generally the ones affected by 
higher unemployment and weaker access to jobs in regulated business (Pierre & Scarpetta 
2004). By refusing to pay the negotiated rates set in the BC, but remaining in the industry, 
manufacturers move into unregulated business. A high level of insecurity characterizes this 
type of business, as the companies are no longer compliant and thus run the risk of being shut 
down. At the same time they cannot receive training or support from the government to move 
their firm back into compliance.  
The cuts in employment occur either through closure or restructuring, as outlined 
above. The trend of firms re-inventing themselves as trading houses is pushing the 
responsibility of employment to supplying firms. Others have relocated their production 
facilities to non-metro areas or out of South Africa (Gibbon 2002). This can again relate to 
Marx‟ (in Harvey 1982) understanding of the balance between wages and profit and how 
capital can affect supply and demand of labour. As the wage rates set by the Bargaining 
Council are interfering with capital accumulation, capital is recessing and creates a crisis in 
terms of employment. To secure the continuation of capital accumulation, business is 
relocating to places where the wages are lower, or forcing the remaining production to take 
place in unregulated business with lower wages. Informants from the sector confirm this: 
Also what happens is that the bigger manufacturers... who really control the market, what 
they do is that while they are BC compliant they perpetuate the system by outsourcing to 
CMTs that are not BC compliant and getting their work done at a really ridiculously 
small price (EThekwini Municipality official 15.06.10). 
What the citation explains is how the possibility to relocate forces price pressure on local 
manufacturers. Because of the incompatibility between labour regulations and the low prices 
offered by customers, the cuts will normally hit labour costs as a way to secure profits. They 
do not see any other opportunity than to continue production in semi-regulated or unregulated 
business. The large manufacturers can then benefit at both ends; relocation to low-cost areas 
and taking advantage of local price competition. 
As large amounts of the workforce are thrown into unemployment, they lack other 
alternatives than submitting to the harsh realities of the labour market. What is interesting 
about Marx‟ theory is that it makes the assumption of a closed market; after capital has 
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created a large supply of workers adjusting to capital‟s retained power, capital would then 
again create employment, though under conditions less favourable for labour. The reason for 
creating an employment crisis is to regain control and discipline of the labour force (Harvey 
1982). But with the global sourcing patterns in clothing production, capital does not have to 
return to the same pool of unemployed labour that it first created. As we have seen in Durban, 
capital is creating a crisis through its withdrawal from Durban employment. The strict labour 
regulations create unfavourable conditions for clothing production. As there are plenty of 
other low-cost areas suitable for capital‟s needs in non-metro areas, neighbouring countries or 
Asia, this capital might not (and frequently does not) return to Durban.  
6.3.2 Labour and Security  
 
In the prevailing climate, the clamour for jobs – any jobs – drowned out demands for a 
living wage and humane working conditions (Marais 2011:187). 
With the labour market conditions outlined in the previous section, the citation above gives a 
clear description on what is left for workers in Durban. One can argue that clothing is a 
degrading industry, as it is one of the most fragmented industries in the world and chases low 
production costs. To a certain extent, South Africa is following a path already laid out by 
other developed countries. Advancements in the economy will first affect labour-intensive 
industries, as the production stages are flexible and relatively mobile. According to Fröbel et 
al. (1980), this will raise unemployment rates in the country. The dynamics of the industry 
lead to a search for even more flexible working conditions and better ways to gain profit. A 
clothing manufacturer argues; “It‟s globalisation but you‟re not playing by the same set of 
rules” (Interview 26.06.10), referring to how the strict regulations in the industry may hamper 
manufacturers‟ global competitiveness. As pointed out by both Kaplinsky (2001) and 
Kalantaridis et al. (2008), companies are finding other ways to capitalize in the clothing 
industry. As we have seen, these include a shedding of labour as production can be done at a 
lower price in non-metro areas or in other countries. South Africa has the highest wages in the 
Southern African region. Their neighbouring countries have large supplies of cheap labour, 
leading to a shift of production to these areas (Gibbon 2002), if not withdrawing from 
production to focus on design, marketing and sale.  
The South African population is unusually dependent on the labour market in the 
distribution of income (Nattrass and Seekings 2001), which could signify a difference from 
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many other countries advancing from labour- to capital-intensive industries. Smallholder 
agriculture is close to irrelevant in South Africa. This can be traced back to the Apartheid era, 
where black sharecroppers and labour tenants were forced off white-owned land during 
industrialisation and deagrarianisation. Being excluded from towns through pass laws, a large 
part of the population was forced into reserves. The rural production in these areas collapsed 
as a result of overproduction. Waged work became the main source of income, which led to a 
high level of integration into the capitalist system (Nattrass & Seekings 2001). This 
dependence on wage work in combination with low skills, make a movement away from 
labour-intensive industries a serious threat to the livelihood of the population. Where one can 
see a shift away from labour-intensive industries in South Africa, there are signs of an 
economy advancing without corresponding to population needs. According to Theron et al. 
(2007), the recent trend in the South African labour market is pushing lesser skilled workers 
out of employment, while the number of skilled positions has increased. 
The South African economy resembles one of a middle-income country and is thus 
subject to competition through NIDL. Retailers are governing the value chain, and 
increasingly importing from non-metro areas or other countries. At the global arena, South 
Africa, with the middle-income status, finds itself competing with the highly productive 
developed countries and low wage countries (Theron et al. 2007). Kingdon and Knight (2007) 
use the insider-outsider theory of labour economists, where regulated workers can be regarded 
insiders, and workers in the unregulated sector and the unemployed, as outsiders. Being a 
highly simplistic conceptualisation of labour market segments, it can still be used to sketch 
insecurity in the labour market in Durban. Insiders, through Kingdon and Knight‟s (2007:819) 
conceptualisation; “fall within the scope of industrial relations regulations, including 
recognition of trade unions and collective bargaining, the right to strike, protection against 
dismissal, and minimum standards concerning hours of normal and overtime work, minimum 
wages, and minimum leave provisions”. Outsiders naturally fall outside the formal labour 
regulations, and generally receive much lower income (Kingdon & Knight 2007). What this 
conceptualisation implies is that the insiders have secure working conditions, but it can be 
argued that no job is currently safe in the Durban industry. Hence, even with an internal 
segmentation of the clothing industry with regulated, semi-regulated and unregulated parts, 
one can argue that the whole industry is being pushed towards the outsider category.  
I don‟t see a future, to be honest. They‟ll always be there, but it‟ll not be in the formal 
sector that we are. You will see. Have you been to any Chatsworth or Clearwood 
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factories? It‟ll be that sector that‟ll remain, but it‟ll be unofficial, I don‟t believe it‟ll be a 
council to control it, I believe they will manipulate the labour force, as far as wages and 
that‟s concerned. And it‟ll be very underhanded business, they‟ll compete with China. 
That‟s what I‟m seeing…I don‟t see a formal sector producing, I see buying houses, I see 
marketing, but I can‟t see production (CMT manufacturer 02.06.10).  
The CMT manufacturer above explains how he perceives the future of the industry. He sees 
what is left of production is being moved to the unregulated sector, with low wages and high 
levels of insecurity for workers. Production is not competitive within the current labour 
regulations, and the consequences will ultimately hit the workers. Companies and retailers are 
bypassing the Durban workforce by making reduction of local labour a restructuring strategy. 
The remaining local manufacturers are floating back and forth on the borders of regulated and 
unregulated business. The workers in compliant companies are thus competing with low-wage 
areas in non-metro areas, other countries and with the unregulated and semi-regulated 
segments of production in Durban. As regulated business is struggling to compete with low-
cost production from Asia, the workforce is increasingly being pushed over the edge to the 
insecure segments outside BC regulations or out of employment (Kingdon & Knight 2007). 
Hence, it is impossible to place any of the segments of workers in Durban in the insider 
category. Because of a lack of alternatives, skills and career opportunities in the industry, 
workers in Durban‟s clothing industry have an insecure future. Carnoy‟s (1980 in Beerepoot 
2010) differentiation between a high-education segment, a unionized segment and a 
competitive segment seems irrelevant in the Durban clothing industry. The whole workforce 
in Durban can be described through his concept of a competitive segment; a large and poorly 
educated labour force competing for jobs with low and unstable working conditions, even 
though a large part of the workers in regulated business are unionised. Here, Friedman (2006 
in Beerepoot 2010) could be more useful, as he includes a global aspect in the segmentation 
theory. Through his hypothesis, the threats of globalisation are so severe that only a small 
group of workers can secure long-term employment. For the majority of workers, it becomes 
necessary to constantly reinvest in their knowledge and skills in order to secure future 
employment in a globally competitive labour market. Skills deficit is a challenge in Durban, 
as a large part of the population is semi- or low skilled. This poses a problem when the 
economy is advancing without the population on board, and where strict labour regulations 
conflicts with trade liberalisation. A union official from SACTWU will have the final words 
with his envision of the industry‟s future: 
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I see a lot of unemployment... I see a lot of young women surely being unemployed 
whatever qualification they may have, because clothing industry was one of those basic 
industries. There will still be a clothing industry but in the next 20 years it will be a 
completely different industry. It will grow in massive in neighbouring countries. I see 
here in South Africa there will be design houses, stores, warehouses and so forth. Like 
putting labels, that‟s it (SACTWU official 17.06.10). 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has shown that Durban manufacturers find themselves in a squeeze between 
competition which is pushing production costs down and labour regulations which are 
pushing production costs up. When there are fewer orders directed towards the local market, 
competition between manufacturers has increased. This is expressed in Bargaining Council 
negotiations where larger manufacturers are agreeing on higher wages and more protection to 
remove local competitors. One can divide the response at the company level into four groups: 
First, manufacturers are altering the company format either by converting into trading houses 
or co-operatives. Trading houses serve as middlemen between retail and production, and co-
operatives transform their labour force into independent contractors and therefore fall out of 
BC‟s labour regulations. The second is relocation, where companies relocate production to the 
non-metro areas in KwaZulu-Natal or neighbouring countries to be able to produce cheaper 
and avoid production in Durban. The third option is continue operations in unregulated 
business to lower the costs, though with close links to regulated business. The final option is 
closure. 
 In the labour market one see a general shedding of jobs due to the incompatibility of 
global competition in production and the strict labour regulations in Durban. Companies 
regard employing as the most challenging part in the industry. This has led to high levels of 
insecurity for Durban‟s workers, where the workforce can be described by the competitive 
segment of Carnoy (1980 in Beerepoot 2010) and no job in the industry could be regarded as 
safe and long-term. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
The thesis has presented a broad theoretical approach and analysed how industrial 
restructuring in Durban relates to the overarching theories. Before concluding, we will revisit 
the research questions asked in the introduction: 
- What are the factors that deteriorate competitiveness of manufacturers in the industry, 
and how does this affect their position in the value chain? 
- What strategies are the manufacturers in Durban using to stay competitive? 
- How do these strategies affect employment opportunities in the Durban labour 
market? 
 
The findings from the analysis that answer these research questions are summed up in the 
following chapter. 
7.1 Competitiveness in Durban 
According to Moody (1997), there is no such thing as a global free market or perfect 
competition. The only global aspect about current production systems is that they are 
subordinated to the capitalist economic system. As we have seen in Durban, most 
manufacturers are feeling the dark side of the picture, namely that they do not have the 
production costs required to take part in the competition. Trade liberalisation was brought 
upon the industry nationally with the GEAR policies, and internationally with the phase out of 
the MFA. This led to a complete turn-around of the competitive framework, making 
production costs a competitive advantage.  
As we have seen in the theoretical chapter, the Fordist production mode in the post-
war period slowed down the inherently expansionary drive of capitalism, as the mode of 
accumulation was accompanied by a mode of regulation that gave increased purchasing 
power to national consumers (Munck 2002). This dual dynamic was also a cause of the crisis 
of Fordism, when inflexible labour regulations were seen as a contributor to the slow-down of 
capital accumulation. The expansion of the production system in a search for new markets 
and areas to invest in was made possible through the spread of neo-liberal policies, with trade 
liberalisation being one of the most important aspects. Hence, the fussy concept of 
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globalisation is concealing the political and ideological aspects that spread the competitive 
production mode globally (Van der Westhuizen 2009). The neo-liberal policies enabled the 
expansion of the capitalist system, as neo-liberal states seek to reduce the barriers to the 
movement of capital (Harvey 2006).  
In the South African context, membership in the WTO and the following liberalisation 
of trade were seen as necessary measures for the country to take part in global trade after the 
Apartheid era. The GEAR program presented a shift in South African policy towards 
economic openness. The industry was built up under a regime of strict tariff protection, and 
with the changes in trade policy, the manufacturers had to cope with increased competition 
through heavy import penetration. The Durban industry is focused on mass-production 
towards the lower market segments and thus in direct competition with low-cost countries in 
the Southern African region as well as Asian countries. This places an enormous pressure on 
production costs, as output prices have to match the price of imported goods. If Durban‟s 
manufacturers cannot meet the proposed price, production is relocated to non-metro areas in 
KwaZulu-Natal, neighbouring countries or the garments are simply imported.  
7.1.1 Labour Regulations and Global Competition 
Inflexible labour regulations were seen as one of the main contributors to the breakdown of 
the Fordist production system (Lipietz 1997). With the introduction of neo-liberal policies the 
wage relation was made subject to competition. The outcome was a possibility for capital to 
pit places and workers against each other to make them compete in providing a business 
friendly environment (Lier 2007). Hence, strict labour regulations became difficult to sustain 
in labour-intensive industries. 
  The South African government introduced numerous legislations to protect labour as a 
way to balance the skewed labour market inherited from the Apartheid era. The changes in 
labour market regulations coincided with the above mentioned trade liberalisation and 
retailers were given new opportunities for cheaper sourcing outside of Durban. Hence, 
manufacturers were left in a price squeeze. Labour costs are one of the few areas where 
manufacturers can lower production costs, when given a fixed price, textile and design from 
the buyer. South Africa‟s strict labour regulations are thus pushing them out of the industry or 
into unregulated business, due to the high competitive levels. Production costs are 
significantly lower in non-metro areas in KwaZulu-Natal, neighbouring countries and 
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overseas. Where transportation costs do not exceed the gains of relocation, this is seen as a 
profitable strategy. The result is that production in regulated business is close to impossible to 
maintain in Durban, revealing the antagonism between global competitiveness and strict 
labour regulations. 
7.1.2 The Dilemma of Regulation 
 
The changed competitive framework in the clothing industry has provoked dilemmas of 
regulation locally. As we have seen, the majority of Durban manufacturers are having 
difficulties coping with the existing labour regulations. The cheaper production in e.g. Asia 
has made retail, trading houses and large manufacturers move away from local orders and use 
foreign suppliers. The altered trade regime provokes a situation where companies cannot 
produce profitably as the negotiated labour costs are not globally competitive. 
 A reduction of labour protection can lead to a race to the bottom; manufacturers lower 
production costs at the expense of wages and protection for workers due to price pressure 
from their buyers (Appelbaum et al. 2005). The question then arise; can companies in the 
clothing industry secure employment opportunities while protecting labour? The answer to 
this dilemma is yet to be found in Durban, as the manufacturers consider the current labour 
legislation incompatible with competition on price from other clothing producing countries. 
At the same time, non-compliant companies cannot make use of the support schemes created 
by the government. So what is left for the non-compliant companies if there is no government 
support? They either have to downsize to bypass the labour laws, relocate production, avoid 
regulation through loopholes in the system, close down, or wait for the Bargaining Council to 
close them down. The companies are facing a situation where they cannot create stable and 
secure employment because the assistance necessary to combine protection and 
competitiveness is not available. In Durban, the employment possibilities for semi- and low-
skilled workers dwindle down. 
The weak institutional framework is visible in Bargaining Council negotiations where 
it is possible for larger manufacturers to suppress local competition by agreeing on higher 
wages and more labour protection. The smaller manufacturers do not have the cost structure 
to afford increasing production costs. When seen in the light of capitalist dynamics, this is a 
way of individual capitalists pushing the costs of capital restructuring on to each other, as 
outlined by Marx (in Harvey 1982). All the agents in the industry seem well aware of the fact 
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that production in the industry cannot survive within the current industrial framework, but a 
strategic plan to cope with this dilemma is yet to be developed. 
7.1.3 Power and Pressure in the Value Chain 
As mentioned, capital accumulation is driven by competition, and individual capitalists will 
find strategies to push losses on to other capitalists when the accumulation process is inhibited 
(Harvey 1982, 2010). Value chain analysis is a viable way to understand the concept of 
governance and power in global trade, and to explain and understand processes of production 
and industrialisation (Gereffi et al. 2001). The link between the value chain perspective and 
dynamics of capitalist production lays in the issues of labour control and competition. By 
subjecting labour regulations to competition, companies are confronted with the underlying 
conflict between capital and labour. Strict control and discipline of labour is essential to keep 
labour costs at a competitive level in labour-intensive industries. Due to the high levels of 
competition in clothing production, this control is determining profit. Manufacturers in these 
industries must be able to produce at lowest costs possible to stay in business, hence control 
implies that the labour force must submit to the global cost structures. If the control is 
hampered, companies will try to push the responsibility of controlling labour on to other 
individual capitalists. 
As the cost of labour has been subject to competition, power is accumulating at the 
retail end of the chain where companies search for ways to distance themselves from the 
competitive pressure at the manufacturing level. In Durban one can observe that the retailers 
and trading houses have the bargaining power as they are not dependent on local production. 
When manufacturers have few international buyers due to export constraints, their continued 
production is conditioned by the sourcing decisions from South African retail. Governance in 
the value chain is thus in the hands of capitalists that do not have to control the labour force 
directly. Alteration of the company format can be seen as a way to create new pockets of 
operations in the value chain. By distancing their own operations from actual production, 
more power is obtained, as work, responsibility and costs can be pushed further down the 
value chain (Nordås 2004). In Durban, manufacturers are turning their companies into trading 
houses to get closer to the retail end of the value chain, and further away from labour and 
production. Additionally, larger manufacturers are starting to distance themselves from 
production by increasing the use of outsourced production and imported goods. 
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When power accumulates at the retail end of the chain, the pressure is felt at the lower 
levels. At the manufacturing level, many of the smaller manufacturers do not have volume or 
capital to follow the path outlined above. Left with low (or no) bargaining power they are 
forced to take whatever order coming their way. As Durban manufacturers are not in a 
position to make demands on buyers, they are forced to meet the low costs offered. They are 
pushed out of compliance with the Bargaining Council, meaning out of regulated business, or 
out of the industry through closure.  
7.2 Strategies of Avoidance 
As a response to deteriorating competitiveness, companies in Durban are using strategies that 
avoid labour regulations or they try to climb the value chain ladder. Labour must either be 
suppressed or eliminated through technological changes. The struggle with labour regulations 
in Durban has made companies search for strategies to avoid labour regulations that hamper 
competitiveness. As we have seen, these strategies include continued production in 
unregistered business where companies can avoid the regulations from the BC. Secondly, an 
alteration of the company format to distance operations from labour because of the 
challenging cost structure in Durban. Thirdly, a relocation of production to non-metro areas or 
neighbouring countries to avoid the costs of labour in Durban. Fourthly, outsourcing of orders 
to other companies in Durban, non-metro areas or neighbouring countries for the same 
reasons as in option three. Finally, they distance the company from labour by relying 
completely on imports from Asia. All the strategies demonstrate that the combination of 
Durban‟s regulated business and global competition is unsustainable, and result in a shedding 
of Durban‟s regulated labour force. 
7.2.1 Avoiding the Responsibility for Labour 
 
The strategies of avoidance signify an avoidance of the responsibility of direct employment. 
Manufacturers are aiming at finding alternative ways to distance themselves from the 
responsibility placed upon them through labour regulations in the BC. Retail has distanced 
itself from the responsibility of direct employment, demanding a production price that does 
not correspond to production costs. Trading houses have removed the operations that require 
labour, now functioning as middlemen between retail and production. Large manufacturers 
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continue to shrink their production base in Durban. The responsibility of labour is then shifted 
to other companies. The manufacturers left in Durban avoid the responsibility of labour by 
circumventing the labour regulations. This is done by either turning their company into co-
operatives or produce in unregulated business. The labour force in unregulated production 
submits to lower wages and less protection because other employment opportunities are 
limited. As outlined by Kaplinsky (2001), profit is no longer to be found in production, as the 
cost of labour in Durban does not fulfil the needs of capital. According to Marx‟ (in Harvey 
1982), capital will withdraw from employment because of a need to regain control over 
labour.  
7.3 Effects on Labour  
The competitive struggle to keep production costs down, will ultimately hit labour costs. As 
discussed earlier, the purpose of hiring a worker is to enhance the part of capital that belongs 
to the employer (Braverman 1974). For the labour force to be useful to capital, it must fulfil 
certain qualities to secure further capital accumulation (Harvey 2010). These qualities are not 
met in the regulated labour force, as it is too expensive for business to operate profitably. 
Therefore, there has been a displacement of jobs from the regulated sector to the unregulated 
parts of the industry. These jobs are characterised by a higher degree of insecurity, ultimately 
affecting the workers.  
Segmentation theory outlines a distinction between workers as insiders (core workers, 
primary segment, unionised segment) and outsiders (peripheral workers, secondary segment, 
competitive segment) (Kingdon & Knight 2007). The distinction is meant to illustrate how 
different workers in different places have distinct characteristics regarding hiring criteria, 
working conditions, wage levels and career prospects, and to what extent workers are 
vulnerable to the competition enforced by globalisation (Beerepoot 2010). However, it is 
difficult to make this distinction within the Durban clothing industry, as competition is so 
harsh that none of the workers can secure stable, decent and long-term employment relations. 
Even though employed in regulated business and unionised, none of the jobs can be deemed 
secure due to the competitive business climate. In unregulated business, workers must accept 
lower wages, a worsening of working conditions and less protection. The alternatives outside 
the industry are limited for a low- or semi-skilled labour force in a country with one of the 
highest unemployment rates in the world (Kingdon & Knight 2007). 
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7.4 Contribution to the field and transferability 
Several scholars have made comprehensible analyses of the dynamics and processes present 
in the clothing industry. Studies have had a main focus on less developed countries with low-
cost production, especially in Asia, with working conditions and their extended effects being 
the central point. Some have also focused on competitive advantages and innovation. What 
this thesis brings to the table is highlighting company strategies in a defined context of 
clothing production, and linking these to theories on global production. The Durban context 
also sheds light on how the price pressure in production is not only affecting less developed 
countries, but also a middle-income country like South Africa. The thesis has revealed how 
competition manifests itself in a local context, e.g. through negotiations in the Bargaining 
Council, where manufacturers are pushing the losses of restructuring onto each other. The 
local manifestations are context specific, but the processes affecting them can illustrate global 
trends in clothing production and therefore be of value in other contexts. The study of a 
middle-income country clarifies the processes that have led to the dual division in clothing 
production, as mentioned in the introduction.  
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Appendix: Interview guide for manufacturers 
1. Informant background: 
1.1 Age? 
1.2 Origin/Nationality? 
1.3 Position? 
1.4 How long have you held your position? 
1.5 How long have you worked in the clothing industry? 
1.6 How long have you worked in the company/factory? 
1.7 What did you do before you entered the clothing industry? 
1.8 Why did you choose working in the clothing industry? 
1.9 Do you have education/professional training within clothing production/management etc. 
(depending on position)? 
 
2. Company data: 
2.1 How long has the company been operative? 
2.2 What do you produce? 
2.3 Who do you produce for? Permanent vs. Cyclic clients? Production in one place? 
2.4 How many employees do you have? 
2.5 What kind of ownership does this company hold? National/foreign/direct/indirect 
2.6 Has this changed over time? Why? 
2.7 How is the quality of your production equipment? Age and technology generation 
(categories)? When did you last upgrade the equipment? Why? From where do you get 
the equipment? How do you rate standard of equipment? (company, industry, 
international) 
2.8 What kind of competitive advantage does your production hold? Delivery, quality, 
design, price? 
2.9 Why have you chosen this competitive advantage? 
2.10 What kind of competitive advantage would be the most desirable? 
2.11 How would you describe competition in the industry? Who are your competitors? 
2.12 Would you say this has changed over time? How? 
2.13 Would you argue that your company is competitive? Nationally/internationally? 
2.14 How would you say the company/factory has changed over time?  
2.15 What are the changes made to restructure the company?  
2.16 What would you say are the reasons your company has reacted in this particular way? 
2.17 What has influenced your choice of strategy? Motivation for change? 
2.18 What possibilities for re-structuring do a company of your size have? 
2.19 What are the challenges you meet as a manufacturer in 2010? 
2.20 Have you relocated any of your production? If yes, why? If no, is this a possible 
strategy? Have you been affected by other companies relocation? How? Why do you 
think they are relocating?  
2.21 Which markets is your production aimed at? Export (where)/local/national (where)? 
Changes over time? 
2.22 Which market segments do you aim your production at? 
2.23 How have your markets and market segments changed over time? Why? 
2.24 How is your company‟s relation to the Bargaining Council? 
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Export: 
2.25 What does your company produce for export?   
2.26 What was the motivation for export production? When did you start? 
2.27 What are the challenges/possibilities regarding export production? 
2.28 How would you say the export conditions have changed over time? 
Local/National/no export: 
2.29 Why have you chosen not to export production? 
2.30 What are the challenges/possibilities regarding production towards a local market?  
2.31 What are the challenges/possibilities regarding production towards a national market? 
2.32 How would you say these challenges/possibilities have changed over time? 
2.33 In what ways has the increase of imports at the national market influenced your 
company/factory? Illegal imports? 
 
3. The MFA/ATC: 
3.1 Are you familiar with the MFA/ATC?  
3.2 Would you say that the MFA/ATC has affected the clothing industry? If yes: In which 
ways? And what has this meant for your company? If no: Why not? 
3.3 Would you say that the phasing out of the MFA/ATC has affected the competition in the 
industry? If yes: In which way? What has this meant for your company? If no: Why not?  
3.4 Would you say that the phasing out of MFA/ATC has affected production in your 
company? How? 
3.5 Would you say that the phasing out has affected the competitiveness of the company? 
3.6 How would you evaluate your company‟s adaptation after the MFA/ATC? 
3.7 What would be the reasons why other companies have adapted to the changes 
worse/better in comparison with your? 
3.8 What challenges/possibilities has the phasing out of the MFA/ATC given the company? 
The industry? 
 
4. Relations business-government: 
4.1 Would you say that national industrial policy for the textile/garment industry has changed 
over time? In what ways? 
4.2 How have national initiatives affected your company?  
4.3 What channels does the industry hold to influence local and national government? How 
can you make use of these channels? What about lobbying? 
4.4 How would you say initiatives in the business community have affected national 
decisions? 
4.5 How is your company affected by initiatives from the business community? 
4.6 In your opinion, what should be the main focus of the government in supporting the 
industry? 
 
5. Outsourcing: 
5.1 Do you outsource any of your production? Why?  
5.2 Which parts of production do you outsource? Who do you outsource to? Where are they 
located? 
5.3 Do these have different status in relation to your company? Permanent or only if 
demanded? How can you make sure these are compliant with the BC? 
5.4 Would you say your use of outsourcing has changed over time? How, more/less? 
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5.5 Have you been forced to extend the use of outsourcing because of downsizing? 
5.6 How would you relate the changes in subcontracting to the phasing out of MFA/ATC? 
Did you start subcontracting after the phasing out of MFA/ATC? Why? 
5.7 Does your factory take outsourced orders from other companies? What kind of 
companies? How is your relationship with these companies? 
Would you say these relations have changed over time? How? How would you relate 
these changes to the phasing out of MFA/ATC?  
 
6. Employment: 
6.1 How big is your workforce? Has this changed over time? Who is your typical worker? 
6.2 Do your workers have different status? Why? 
6.3 Is a solution for flexibility in your company to hire more temporary workers/use labour 
hire agencies etc?  
6.4 Have you been forced to downsize your workforce? Why? When?  
6.5 When downsizing, what group of workers has been/would have been dismissed? (sex, 
age, nationality, confront with experiences from other places)  
6.6 Why has/would this particular part of the workforce been/be dismissed? 
6.7 How has changing the workforce served as competitive strategies? 
6.8 Would you say that the salaries/amount of work pr. worker/hours of work changed over 
time? How? 
6.9 Have the workers accepted increase in efficiency or decrease in salaries to support 
survival of the industry? Should they? 
6.10 How could the fact that South Africa in general has higher salaries than other 
producing countries be a limitation for the industry? 
6.11 Has the phasing out of MFA/ATC had any effect on relations regarding employment? 
How? 
 
7. Trade unions: 
7.1 How is the cooperation, if any between the industry and trade unions? Between the 
company and trade unions? 
7.2 Would you describe trade unions as a curse or a blessing for the industry, with re-
structuring being at a dramatic point?  
7.3 Would you say that trade unions should adjust demands on the industry? Why? 
7.4 Would you say that trade unions limit innovation and competitiveness of the industry? 
How? 
 
8. Future opportunities: 
8.1 What future plans does the company have?  
8.2 What are the possibilities/constraints for renewal/innovation? 
8.3 What are the challenges/opportunities regarding access to capital? 
8.4 Would you say this changed over time? How? 
8.5 How do you perceive the company‟s future? 
8.6 How do you perceive the South-African industry‟s future? 
 
9. Have I forgotten any important aspects of the business community or the company? 
10. Anything you would like to ask me? 
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